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Environmental regulations are increasingly subjected to benefit-cost analysis as
an aid to decision-making in policy. Economic benefits are most appropriately measured
by the tradeoffs of other goods and services that people are willing to make to obtain
reductions in risks to their lives and health. The measure of willingness to pay (WTP)
allows for this comparison. These benefits from risk reductions are likely to vary
systematically by characteristics of the individual, including the number and ages of
children present in the household, and by the type of health threat under consideration.
In chapter one of this dissertation, I write a brief introduction. In the second
chapter, I examine an important methodological issue-the extent of "scenario
adjustment" in a Stated Preference (SP) conjoint choice experiment in the context of a
household survey concerning health risk reductions. Scenario adjustment occurs when
respondents assume that a substantive alternative in a choice set, in their own particular
case, will be different than the survey instrument describes. This is a potential source of
bias in SP research similar to scenario rejection, but harder to detect. I analyze the
impact of scenario adjustment on WTP and suggest a possible correction.
In the third chapter, I address the empirical question of patterns in adults' WTP
for health risk reductions. I find that demand is influenced by the presence of children,
the numbers of children in different age brackets currently in the household, and, for
health risks with latency periods, by the prospect of children still being present when a
parent's ill health begins or death occurs.
In chapter four, I find systematic differences in WTP for health risk reductions
across different types of major health threats, such as Alzheimer's disease versus heart
attacks. I also look for evidence of a cancer premium due to the dread factor associated
with the prospect of cancer. The health threats considered include chronic heart disease,
sudden heart attacks, five types of cancers, respiratory disease, stroke, diabetes,
Alzheimer's disease and traffic accidents. In chapter five, I conclude.
This dissertation includes previously unpublished co-authored material.
v
vi
CURRICULUM VITAE
NAME OF AUTHOR: Erica H. Johnson
GRADUATE AND UNDERGRADUATE SCHOOLS ATTENDED:
University of Oregon, Eugene, OR
University of Montana, Missoula, MT
DEGREES AWARDED:
Doctor of Philosophy, Economics, Spring 2009, University of Oregon
Master of Science, Economics, Fall 2005, University of Oregon
Bachelor of Arts, Economics, Spring 1999, University of Montana
AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST:
Environmental Economics, Health, International Trade, Econometrics
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE:
Assistant Professor, School of Business, Gonzaga University, Fall 2008 -
present
Courses Taught:
Managerial Economics, Fall 2008
Microeconomics, Fall 2008
Business Forecasting, Spring 2009
Economic Environment of the Firm (MBA), Spring 2009
Graduate Teaching Fellow, Department of Economics, University of Oregon,
2004-2008
Independent Course Instructor
Environmental Economics, Spring 2008
Intermediate Microeconomics, Fall 2006, Fall 2007
Introduction to Microeconomics, Summer 2006, Spring 2007
Teaching Assistant
Introduction to Microeconomics and Macroeconomics
GRANTS, AWARDS AND HONORS:
Mikesell Prize in Environmental and Natural Resource Economics 2008
Graduate Teaching Fellowship, University of Oregon 2004 - 2008
Kleinsorge Summer Fellowship, University of Oregon, 2007
Graduate School Research Award, University of Oregon, 2006-2007
PUBLICATIONS:
Cameron TA, DeShazo JR, Johnson EH. The effect of children on adult
demands for health risk reductions. Revise-and-resubmit at Journal of Health
Economics 2009.
vii
Vlll
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I wish to express sincere appreciation to Professors Trudy Cameron, J.R.
DeShazo, Bill Harbaugh, Robin McKnight, and Ron Mitchell for their assistance in the
preparation of this document and the valuable guidance they have given me. This
research has been supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation (SES-
0551009) to the University of Oregon (PI: Trudy Ann Cameron). It employs original
survey data from an earlier project supported by the US Environmental Protection
Agency (R829485) and Health Canada (Contract H5431-010041/001lSS). Additional
support has been provided by the Raymond F. Mikesell Foundation at the University of
Oregon. Office of Human Subjects Compliance approval filed as Protocol #C4-380-07F
at the University of Oregon. This work has not been formally reviewed by any of the
sponsoring agencies. Any remaining errors are my own.
IX
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter Page
1. illTRODUCTION 1
II. WILLINGNESS TO PAY AND SCENARIO ADJUSTMENT..... 16
1. Introduction........................................................................................................ 16
2. Related Literatw·e............................................................................................... 21
3. Available Choice Data....................................................... 24
4. Empirical Specification. 27
5. Empirical Results 36
6. Conclusion 40
III. WILLillGNESS TO PAY AND HOUSEHOLD STRUCTURE.......................... 44
1. Introduction........................................................................................................ 44
2. Available Choice Data....................................................................................... 52
3. A Random Utility Choice Model....................................................................... 56
4. Empirical Estimation 56
4.1 Family Structure and Differences in the Marginal Utility of Income........ 58
4.2 Family Structure and the Marginal Utility of Avoided Health Risks 61
5. Results for Simulated Distributions of Microrisk Reductions 64
5.1 Gender........................................................................................................ 66
5.2 Presence of Children 66
Chapter
x
Page
5.3 Presence of Second Income 67
5.4 Differences Across Illness Profiles 68
6. Conclusion 69
IV. WILLINGNESS TO PAY AND TYPE OF DISEASE......................................... 74
1. Introduction........................................................................................................ 74
2. Choice Data and Empirical Specification......... 78
2.1 Confidence.................. 79
2.2 Vulnerability.................. 80
2.3 Controllability 81
2.4 Subjective Risk 82
2.5 Smoker 82
3. Empirical Results 83
4. Conclusion 88
V. CONCLUSION 90
APPENDICES 95
A. FIGURES AND TABLES. 95
B. SCENARIO ADJUSTMENT INDICATORS 128
C. ALTERNATIVE SCENARIO ADJUSTMENT MODELS 137
D. FULL HOUSEHOLD STRUCTURE MODEL. 143
BIBLIOGRAPHy 146
xi
LIST OF FIGURES
R~ p~
1. One Example of a Randomized Choice Scenario 95
2. Example of a Debriefing Question Used to Correct for Scenario Adjustment...... 96
3. Examples of Benefits Differ Calculations 97
XlI
LIST OF TABLES
Table Page
1. Descriptive Statistics for Scenario Adjustment 98
2. Scenario Adjustment Model 99
3. Simulated WTP for a Microrisk Reduction--Scenario Adjustment 100
4. Descriptive Statistics for Household Structure 101
5. Parsimonious Household Structure Model 102
6. Discernible Heterogeneity with Respect to Household Structure.......................... 105
7. Simulated WTP for a Microrisk Reduction--Household Structure, Age 30 107
8. Simulated WTP for a Microrisk Reduction--Household Structure, Age 45 108
9. Descriptive Statistics for Type of Disease 109
10. Sick Year Shifters Only 110
11. Simple Disease Label Effects 112
12. Simple Disease Label Effects and Sick Year Shifters.......................... 114
13. Full Model 117
14. Parsimonious Model 121
15. Simulated WTP for a Microrisk Reduction, by health threat 126
1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
A main purpose of many environmental regulations, such as the Clean Air Act,
the Clean Water Act, and the Safe Drinking Water Act, is to reduce human exposure to
contaminants and improve human health. Air and water pollution can lead to increased
risks of cancers, respiratory diseases and other adverse health impacts (EPA (2009)).
Environmental policies that reduce air and water pollution can benefit humans by
reducing the risks they face from these health threats. In this dissertation, I focus on the
value of health risk reductions in an effort to quantify the benefits to society of human
health related environmental policies.
Since it is probably costly to attempt to reduce pollution levels to zero, benefit-
cost analyses are an important tool in deciding among policy alternatives. In 1993, the
government mandated in Executive Order #12866 that any regulation with a predicted
economic impact of $100 million or more must be subjected to benefit-cost analysis and
consideration of alternatives (Robinson (2007)). Therefore, good information on both
the costs and benefits of policies is extremely useful to regulatory agencies such as the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). When done properly benefit-cost
analysis is intended to be a neutral and objective tool to render decision making by
regulators more transparent and methodical. The overall net benefit to society from a
policy is determined by the value of the increase in well-being due to the policy minus
the cost of the policy. Using this formula, an inexpensive policy that gives a minor
2increase in well-being for a large number of people may have a larger net benefit than
an expensive policy that significantly benefits only a few people. Since tax dollars to
support environmental and health policies are limited, choices among alternative
policies can be aided through the use of benefit-cost analyses.
One of the challenges in benefit-cost analyses is to figure out the benefits, in
physical terms, from reducing health risks and then to quantify these benefits in dollar
terms so that benefits can be aggregated and compared to the costs. For example, if a
potential environmental policy is expected to have benefits due to a reduction in the
probability of death due to colon cancer and is also expected to increase the amount of
viable habitat for an endangered species, these incommensurate benefits will need to be
aggregated in order to weigh the benefits against the costs. One feasible way to
aggregate heterogeneous benefits is to convert them all into equivalent dollar values so
they can be summed and compared against the costs. For economists, the ideal way to
measure the value of a good is through individuals' willingness to pay (WTP) in the
market. Since health improvements stemming from regulations are not conventional
market goods, it can be difficult to measure an individual's WTP for these types of
health risk reductions in dollar amounts.
Researchers have used many methods to estimate the value of human health
benefits including Cost-of-Illness (COl), Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALY), and
WTP, which is typically measured in terms of the value of a statistical life (VSL). The
Cost-of-Illness approach uses medical expenditures and foregone earnings due to illness
to estimate the value of health. This method is not grounded in economic theory,
3however, and there is no particular reason why medical expenditures and foregone
earnings should be equal to WTP. This method is convenient, however, since it makes
use of information about the direct costs of illnesses and accidents that is usually readily
available. COl estimates could be a lower bound on WTP, but they do not attempt to
include any implicit costs of pain and suffering from the disease or injury, so COl is not
necessarily a very good approximation of the true WTP for health risk reductions
(Tolley et al. (1994)).
A second method of valuing health benefits, typically used in the health
economics literature, is the Quality Adjusted Life Year. The QALY allows for a
comparison of treatments or interventions by standardizing the health outcomes. Rather
than comparing the lives saved from one intervention with the morbidity reduction from
another intervention (like comparing apples and oranges), the QALY assigns a numerical
value to each health outcomes which allows for easier comparison. The QALY is a
product of two numbers, the increase in utility due to the intervention measured on a
scale from zero (death) to one (full health) and the number of years a patient's life is
extended with that utility gain. The gain in utility could be due to reduced morbidity,
mortality or both.
The advantage of QALYs is that different health outcomes can easily be
compared, but they also have several drawbacks. QALYs do not have strong theoretical
underpinnings in economics as WTP measures do. QALYs necessarily give more weight
to health improvements for younger people due to this method's emphasis on extended
years of life-younger people have more potential life-years. The overall change
4(increase) in utility due to an intervention is taken into consideration when estimating a
QALY, but the original level of health of a patient is not taken into consideration.
Several studies, described in Nord (1999) have shown that respondents in moderate
health would prefer to forego medical treatment that would allow them to become fully
healthy if that meant a severely sick person was allocated an intervention that allowed
them to become only moderately sick (or in less pain). Thus, QALYs may not be
representative of societal preferences concerning the allocation of health resources.
Since environmental policies take the form of regulations which impose costs
on business or households, or represent public goods which are funded through tax
dollars, these policies should reflect societal preferences. The ideal way of measuring
benefits to human health would be to look at willingness to pay to avoid health risk
reductions based on the types of choices individuals would make, were there a market
for these risk reductions. This method is ideal since the values can be compared to
other goods and services available for consumers to purchase. This captures the trade-
offs that consumers are willing to make between their health and other market goods.
WFP is based on a strong theoretical foundation because WFP is simply a measure of
inverse demand, where demand is the outcome of consumer optimization constrained by
income.
The difficulty in finding the WFP for health is that health is often not a
conventional market good so we do not have good information in terms of competitive
market clearing prices on how individuals make trade-offs between health and other
goods and services. Outside of the market, however, individuals still regularly make
5these kinds of trade-offs between health and other goods. For example, we sometimes
drive faster to save time but, by doing so, increase our risk of suffering a traffic
accident. People may choose to use their income to buy bottled water instead of
drinking cheaper tap water if they think that bottled water has fewer health risks than
tap water. Laborers may take a more dangerous job in return for hazard pay (a wage
premium). Studying these related decisions that individuals actually make is one way
that researchers can assess an individual's WIP for health and for health risk reductions.
A common way to represent this WIP for the reduction of health risks is through
a measure known as the value of statistical life (VSL). Government agencies such as the
EPA and the Department of Transportation use a VSL to convert the benefits for human
health risk reductions from a particular policy into dollar terms. The VSL is based on a
measure of average individual willingness to pay to achieve a tiny risk change (say 1 in
100,000). Then this WIP is normalized on a very large risk change of 1.0. It is
tempting to interpret this risk reduction as "avoiding certain death" but no such extreme
risk reduction is valued in any of the empirical data on WIP and no risk change as big
as 1.00 is contemplated in any policy context where these values are used. A VSL is
merely a scaled average WTP and is not intended to be equivalent to society's
willingness to pay to save one particular human life with certainty (as that value would
certainly be greater).!
1 It would have been less controversial had early researchers decided instead on the convention to
normalize WTP on, say, a 10-6 risk change (i.e a rnicrorisk), where observed risk changes in empirical
WTP contexts and those being considered in many policy cases would range from tens of hundreds of
microrisk units.
6The decrease in mortality risk used to estimate a VSL may come from many
sources including wage trade-offs made for less risky jobs and WfP for increased
access to medicines and disease prevention. Across studies, each empirical VSL
estimate typically corresponds to a different-sized risk reduction, so it is not appropriate
simply to average the WFP estimates from several studies. Thus, WFP estimates do
need to be standardized on some common size of risk reduction before an average can
be taken. The convention is to use the ratio of the marginal utility of a risk reduction to
the marginal utility of income (a marginal rate of substitution), which is equivalent to
scaling all of these tiny risk reductions and their corresponding WfP estimates to a
vastly larger l.00 risk change. In practice however, after averaging a variety of WfP
estimates, the VSL is then scaled back down again to suit the relatively tiny risk changes
at stake in a given policy context.
There are two general ways to estimate a VSL: revealed preference methods,
most commonly from wage-risk studies, and stated preference methods, from
contingent valuation and conjoint choice experiments. Typical VSL estimates from both
of these methods range between about $1 million and $10 million (Viscusi and Aldy
(2003)).
Wage-risk studies are the most common way of estimating a VSL using revealed
preference (RP) data. This methodology employs a hedonic regression that explains
wage variations using employee-specific characteristics, job characteristics and the
actuarial job fatality risk as the explanatory variables. This method is described
succinctly in Aldy and Viscusi (2007). The slope coefficient on the job fatality risk
7leads to an estimate of the trade-off between risks and wages observed in the labor
market and provides a WTP to reduce mortality risk. The average participant in wage-
risk studies is a male who is about 36-37 years old and the health risk involved in this
decision is typically a sudden, accidental death that occurs at the workplace (Robinson
(2007)).
Although it is a common way to estimate a VSL, this wage-risk measure of a
VSL may not be a good fit when it is "transferred" to the broader population affected by
many environmental policies. The trade-offs between risk and income evidenced within
the working-age population may not match the trade-offs willingly made by members of
the groups most affected by impaired environmental quality. Groups who are not
generally represented by a sample of individuals from the active labor force, such as
children, the elderly and the infirm, are likely to enjoy a large share of the benefits from
improved environmental quality. In addition to the differences between the relevant
populations, the types of health risks from environmental exposures are different from
risks faced in the labor market. Many types of risks from poor environmental quality do
not cause sudden death, but instead involve a considerable latency period before an
individual develops symptoms or dies.
Other contexts where researchers have derived estimates of the benefits using
revealed preference (RP) data include health production functions (Dickie and Gerking
(1991)), hedonic property values (Gayer et al. (2002)), individuals' willingness to
exceed mandated speed limits, (Ashenfelter and Greenstone (2004)), and purchases of
safety equipment (Hakes and Viscusi (2007) and Atkinson and Halvorsen (1990)).
8Stated preference surveys are another tool for measuring VSL. Surveys can be
targeted to represent the general population or a particular sub-population that is
particularly affected by a specific health threat. There are different types of stated
preference survey formats. In contingent valuation methods, preferences tend to be
elicited for a particular program consisting of a fixed bundle of attributes at varying
prices. In conjoint choice experiments, all specified attributes of the alternatives,
including price, are varied independently. According to Krupnick (2007), a good stated
preference study has a large sample size, passes both "scope" and "construct validity"
tests and asks debriefing questions within the survey to identify potential problems such
as scenario rejection. Some notable SP studies that estimate VSL include Alberini et al.
(2004), Alberini et al. (1997), and Bhattacharya et al. (2007).
Although most researchers would prefer to use revealed preference data in
assessments of willingness to pay, such preference data are not always available. In the
health risk reduction context, it will typically be necessary to control for differences in
disease latency (i.e. time-to-onset), the duration of the illness or injury, whether or not
the affliction is fatal, and the number of life-years that may be lost as a result of having
suffered from this illness or injury. The ability to control for these aspects is more easily
done for SP than RP with respect to health. Although there are still potential problems
with stated preference data from poorly designed surveys, many improvements in the
methodology have been made in recent decades. In the second chapter of this
dissertation, I contribute to the literature on methodological improvements by looking at
subjective scenario adjustment by respondents in SP surveys.
9Whether it is derived from RP or SP methods, the standard one-size-fits-all VSL
for all people and all illnesses is imperfect for various reasons. It is a standardized
measure of an inverse demand (a WTP) for health risk reductions, but a constant VSL
implies that the demand does not vary with characteristics of the consumer as does the
demand for most commodities. One particular drawback of the VSL is that it does not
differ according to age-a standard VSL assigns the same value to one lost life-year as
to eighty lost life-years. Therefore, a per-year measure called the Value of a Statistical
Life-Year (VSLy) is used sometimes to quantify WTP in addition to (or in place of) the
VSL. The VSLY is calculated by dividing the standard VSL by average remaining life
expectancy. This method thus assumes that each year is equally valuable. Calculating a
VSL on an annual basis and then multiplying by the number of life-years saved by a
particular policy does not produce an ideal measure either. Younger people have more
years to live, so the value of reducing risks to their health is higher using this measure.
The approach is not based on economic theory, however, but on an arbitrary measure of
life years left.
The standard VSL is simply a fixed value and does not vary with income,
gender, age, household characteristics such as the presence of young children, or by the
type of illness or accident for which a risk reduction is to occur. The same VSL estimate
is typically used whether the program in question leads to a reduction in the risk of lung
cancer, traffic accidents, or heart disease. Considerable empirical work has been done
recently to show that the VSL does vary by individual characteristics, such as age, (e.g.
Aldy and Viscusi (2007), Krupnick (2007), and Robinson (2007)). There is still much
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research to be done to explain how VSL varies with income, age, life expectancy, and
health status as outlined in Hammitt (2007).
Since the human health benefits of environmental, health or safety policy are
unlikely to be uniform across the population, it is important to identify systematic
heterogeneity in WTP. This knowledge will allow policy-makers to choose appropriate
measures for the benefits from potential health risk reductions. In the third and fourth
chapters, my dissertation adds to this body of knowledge. In Chapter III I analyze how
WTP varies with household structure and in Chapter N I look at how WTP varies by the
type of disease or injury risk.
From a policy standpoint, it is important to have reliable measures for both the
benefits and the costs of implementing a policy. WTP is the best measure to use since it
has a strong theoretical motivation and captures the extent to which individuals are
willing to tradeoff between health and other goods and services. (For this reason, WTP
is preferable to the use of QALYs which only allow easy comparisons between different
types of health interventions).
The risk reductions employed in the choice scenarios used in this dissertation
involve a latency period. Therefore, the discount rate is an important issue. Since the
choice contexts concern the individual's future health (rather than intergenerational
choices), discounting is appropriate. I use a 5% discount rate throughout all chapters,
but a sensitivity analysis using 3 and 7% rates is available in Cameron and DeShazo
(2008). Future work using this data on health risk reductions will analyze individual
discount rates.
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A second challenge in evaluating people's preferences to avoid health risks is
that conventional measures assume that people do not adjust and adapt to their changing
health conditions. Research in psychology has shown that people are able to adapt their
expectations and perceptions as their health conditions change, which is called
"response shift" (Schwartz and Sprangers (2000». For example, suppose a perfectly
healthy adult is asked how much she would value life if she were in wheelchair.
Research suggests that she will give a much more pessimistic response than she would
if she actually was confined to a wheelchair and had experienced the opportunity to
adapt to her new condition. Therefore, answers to how much a person would be WTP to
avoid a health risk may be different ex ante, before the individual has a disease, and ex
post, if the disease is already being experienced. The literature on response shift appears
to only consider differences in individuals' responses to specified diseases over time
rather than differences among different diseases. Many different diseases have been
studied, but there seems to be no comparative assessment of heterogeneity in the extent
of response shifts across different diseases..
A third issue that needs to be addressed regarding the estimation of benefits is
the role that these preferences should play policy-making. The idea of "libertarian
paternalism" includes both the notion that policymakers should respect consumer
sovereignty, and the idea that some consumers may not always know what is best for
them partly due to inaccurate or incomplete information. One example of libertarian
paternalism is automatically signing up employees for a 401K plan and requiring them
to opt out (as opposed to inviting them to opt in to the program). Another example is
12
the arrangement of foods at a school cafeteria so that children choose more of the foods
that are good for them and fewer of the foods that are bad for them. This strategy may
alter the transactions costs associated with choices. Thaler and Sunstein (2008) refer to
policies like these as a "nudge" that helps people make better decisions. When people
are left to make their own decisions, they sometimes do not choose wisely. This
"nudge" does not mandate behavior, so people are still able to choose whichever option
they want. However, the relative implicit prices of different options may have changed.
At the other extreme, benefit-cost analyses based on consumer preferences could
potentially dictate policy based purely on whether, or by how much, the benefits of a
policy outweigh the costs. Ultimately environmental policies influence the allocation of
scarce resources, which should probably be used in a manner that will do the most good
for society. The costs of policies are borne by consumers, workers, investors and
taxpayers in the form of higher prices, lower wages, lower investment returns, or higher
taxes. Thus, it seems reasonable that the preferences of the general population should
be an important determinant of how these resources are used so that the greatest value
to society is provided.
Policy should not, of course, be based solely on positive analysis of whether the
benefits outweigh the costs, although benefit-cost analyses that take into account the
societal preferences can be a valuable aid to decision-making. The final policy decision
must carefully consider distributional consequences and may reflect considerable debate
about what is fair and right.
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In this dissertation, I explore some new dimensions of heterogeneity in WFP for
health risk reductions. This information will be important in helping policymakers to
make well-informed decisions about environmental and health policies. Policy-makers
may find it expedient to use a VSL that is the same for everyone. However, this
standard VSL may not represent the true preferences of the types of people receiving the
benefits of a particular policy. Therefore, resources may not be allocated in the correct
way. For example, using the same VSL for a 30-year-old (who may have a high WFP)
and an 80-year-old (who may have a low WFP) could lead to a policy being
implemented (and therefore valuable resources being spent). However, 'if most of the
benefits accrue to the oldest seniors, and these individuals have a lower WFP the overall
benefits may in fact not exceed the costs. These are distributional consequences, of
course, but it i~ important that policy-makers have an accurate measurement of WFP for
health risk reductions in order to indentify environmental policies that have benefits that
outweigh the costs.
The data used throughout this dissertation are derived from a conjoint choice
survey. Cameron and DeShazo (2008) use stated preference methods to elicit
preferences for programs to reduce the risk of morbidity and mortality in a general
population sample of adults 25 years and older in the United States. The survey was
developed carefully using 36 detailed in-person cognitive interviews, three pretests and
a large pilot study. Knowledge Networks, Inc. administered the survey to 2,439 of their
panelists and achieved a respectable 79% response rate.
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Extensive robustness and validity checks of the individuals' responses have been
conducted to evaluate common problems in SP analyses. These include risk
comprehension verification (where individuals are asked to rank the sizes of risk
reductions), checks on the complexity of the choice sets (where individuals are asked to
rate the difficulty of the choice sets), and a "cheap talk" reminder (so that individuals
. are careful to consider their budget constraints and not overstate their willingness to
pay). A number of individuals and/or choice sets were dropped from the analysis
according to minimal exclusion criteria. The exclusion criterion for risk rejection
required that the respondent be able to rank successfully the sizes of the risk reductions
associated with two risk mitigation programs. A total of 4,887 alternatives (1,629
choices) were excluded due to this risk comprehension criterion. The exclusion criterion
for scenario rejection was that the respondent chose the "neither program" alternative
and, in the follow-up question, chose only the answer "I did not believe the programs
would work". A total of 6,708 alternatives (2,236 choices) were excluded due to
scenario rejection. A further 996 alternatives (332 choices) were excluded due to a
minor error in the randomized design. Order effects for the choice sets are considered
and individuals are instructed to assume each choice set is independent of the other
choice sets. Choices are readily demonstrated to be sensitive to the changes in the
scope and central attributes-such as the cost of the program and the size of the risk
reduction. Systematic sample selection effects are controlled for, with methods
explained in detail in Cameron and DeShazo (2008).
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Chapters II, III and IV are co-authored with Trudy Ann Cameron and J.R.
DeShazo. Professors Cameron and DeShazo collected the stated preference data used
in all chapters. I performed the majority of the econometric analyses using these data. I
wrote and edited many drafts of these chapters, although my co-authors and dissertation
committee members have of course provided valuable assistance towards polishing and
refining the exposition.
The rest of this dissertation is as follows. In Chapter II, I consider whether
respondents engage in scenario adjustment rather than taking the stated scenarios at face
value (which the researcher typically assumes). In Chapter III, I discuss how WTP for
health risk reductions varies by household structure such as the number and age of
children in the household. In Chapter IV, I examine whether WTP varies for eleven
different major health threats and check for evidence of a "cancer premium". Chapter V
concludes.
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CHAPTER II
WILLINGNESS TO PAY AND SCENARIO ADJUSTMENT
A version of this chapter is co-authored with Trudy Ann Cameron and J.R. DeShazo
1. Introduction
Researchers have long recognized that subjective beliefs are an important
determinant of consumers' choices (Dominitz and Manski (2004); Manski (2004». For
example, individuals' beliefs about the timing of their own risks for particular illnesses
may determine their willingness to pay to reduce these health risks (e.g., purchase
organic foods), to measure their risks (e.g., purchase a new diagnostic test not currently
covered by insurance), or to buy extra insurance against undesirable health risk
outcomes (e.g., purchase medi-gap policies). As subjective beliefs change, individual
behavior will probably change as well. All of this suggests that individual subjective
beliefs are also likely to play an important role when research subjects answer questions
in stated preference (SP) surveys used to value non-market goods.
An SP survey describes a scenario in which the respondent is offered a
hypothetical opportunity to purchase one or more costly programs that yield particular
sets of individual-specific consequences. When asked to make choices about health-
related programs, individuals may hold strong prior beliefs about many aspects of the
alternatives in the choice scenario, including their risks of particular illnesses, the time
profile of those illness-specific risks over their lifetimes, the effectiveness of preventive
17
actions, the effectiveness of the probable treatments, etc. When respondents hold prior
beliefs about any aspect of the scenario that diverge from the researcher-prescribed
information, three possibilities arise. Respondents may replace their beliefs about
aspects of the scenario with the information provided by the researcher. Alternatively,
they may retain their beliefs and instead reject the choice scenario as irrelevant or
unrealistic, often resulting in a protest response. Finally, they may accept the scenario
but "adjust" some of its informational aspects to fit their own personal situation, history
or context. Scenario adjustment occurs when respondents impute or modify some
aspect of a given scenario based upon their personal beliefs.
This chapter concerns the identification of scenario adjustment and a strategy for
its correction. When respondents engage in scenario adjustment, they assume a different
choice set and thus answer a different choice question than is stated in the survey. This
leads to potential bias in the resulting estimates of willingness to pay for the types of
programs addressed in the survey. Using data from a stated preference survey on health
risk reduction programs, we find evidence of scenario adjustment and then propose and
illustrate a strategy to correct for this behavior. Corrections such as these have the
potential to allow stated choice data to yield more-accurate estimates of willingness to
pay (WTP).
The data are from an existing stated preference survey concerning prospective
health risk reductions, described in Cameron and DeShazo (2008). This survey is
designed to elicit choices that allow the researcher to infer willingness to pay for private
programs which reduce the risk that respondents will experience specific illness profiles
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over their remaining lifespan. An illness profile consists of a description of the
sequence of health states associated with a major illness that a respondent may face in
the future. The specific type of "scenario adjustment" problem we consider in this
chapter has to do with each respondent's degree of acceptance of the stated latency of
illness (i.e. the time until onset). Specific latencies are given for each illness profile
described in the choice sets used in the survey.
Assessment ofthe consequences of scenario adjustment (and thus a potential
correction strategy) is made possible because the respondents are asked debriefing
questions after each stated choice question concerning alternative health risk reduction
programs. These debriefing questions allow the researcher to distinguish between
respondents who appear to accept the latency information given in the choice scenario
(i.e. the ones who answer the choice question based on the latencies described in the
choice scenario) from those who subjectively update the latency information in the
scenario (and thus appear to have answered a somewhat different question). Some
individuals underestimate the latency period before the tangible benefits of the program
would begin. They express the opinion that the program's benefits, in their own case,
would start sooner. Other individuals overestimate the latency period. If assumed
latency affects WTP, then a respondent's latency perceptions can influence their
estimated WTP. 2
2 "Scenario adjustment" might occur as follows. Suppose a male respondent has a family history of heart
disease at age fifty. In his copy of the survey, the stated choice scenario that involves heart disease may
specify that this illness would lead to moderate and/or severe pain and disability starting at age seventy.
However, given his private knowledge, he might answer the question as though the benefits of the
proposed risk reduction program would begin at age fifty.
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If scenario adjustment is ignored, it is possible that this behavior may cause the
researcher to underestimate WTP for some respondents and overestimate WTP for
others, to varying degrees. The opposing effects are unlikely to be exactly offsetting.
Researchers should, whenever possible, calculate and compare estimates with and
without corrections for scenario adjustment. As early as the process of survey design,
researchers should try to anticipate the dimensions along which respondents may be
inclined to adjust the stated choice scenario. Suitable debriefing questions should be
included in the survey to allow a formal assessment of the extent of this behavior.
The researcher still faces the important question of whether these estimates
should be adjusted. Correction of misalignments between what researchers assume
when they ask a survey question, and what respondents assume when they answer it,
may be considered an example of "libertarian paternalism" as discussed by Thaler and
Sunstein (2003) and Smith (2007). "Libertarian paternalism" involves honoring
consumer sovereignty to the greatest extent possible (the libertarian part), but
intervening to override some aspects of behavior if the researcher believes they are
mistakes (the paternalism part).
Which types of mistakes should be corrected ex post by researchers is still an
open question. One class of argument for the correction of misalignments between
researcher intentions and respondents' assumptions concerns incomplete information.
If the mismatch stems from incomplete information, where respondents' choices (or the
researcher's models) are based on objectively incorrect information, then researchers
might want to undertake corrections if it is possible to simulate what would have been
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each respondent's choice had they used complete and accurate information in making
their decisions. In other cases, however, misalignments may stem from fundamental
differences in individual attitudes or preferences-such as the case where respondents
base their choices on their individual private discount rates and these discount rates do
not adequately take into account the welfare of future generations.
The example of scenario adjustment considered in this chapter falls into the first
category described above, namely that of incomplete information. If the researcher
were to use the stated choice conditions from the survey instrument in an empirical
model to explain respondents' choices, this would misrepresent the information actually
being used by that respondent. If researchers have collected sufficient additional
information from each respondent, there is a strong argument for considering ex post
adjustments.
A final consideration when deciding whether scenario adjustment in stated
preference studies should be corrected is the extent to which individuals tend to adjust
analogous choice scenarios in real-life choice situations. If "scenario adjustment"
happens with similar frequency in actual markets, then perhaps these misalignments are
a part of how consumers truly behave in real markets. If a stated preference study is
designed to predict future actual choice behavior, perhaps the SP choice models should
allow people to make the same "mistakes" that they would make in real life. However,
if the goal is welfare assessment based on WTP under conditions of full information,
then perhaps corrections are more justified. Of course, if scenario adjustment is for
some reason more pronounced in hypothetical choice scenarios, as opposed to real
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market conditions, then perhaps the researcher should correct the misalignment in order
to more accurately predict respondents' WTP under real conditions.
The empirical contribution of this chapter is to identify and illustrate one case of
scenario adjustment by respondents to a stated preference survey, and to demonstrate
the potential consequences of this behavior for the resulting estimates of WTP. The
chapter proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews in more detail the related literature on
perceptions and SP. Section 3 briefly describes the survey data relevant to this chapter.
Section 4 discusses the empirical specification and how to control for scenario
adjustment. Section 5 conveys the empirical results and Section 6 concludes.
2. Related Literature
Researchers recognize that respondents bring their beliefs and perceptions about
aspects of a choice scenario into a choice setting (Manski (2004)).3 Researchers are
also aware that the information provided in a choice scenario may conflict with
respondents' beliefs and perceptions for several reasons. One common reason involves
the random assignment of efficiently designed conjoint choice sets. This may result in
some respondents being presented with scenarios containing unrealistic or irrelevant
choice alternatives, given the individual's beliefs. A tension may thus arise between the
efficient design of a choice set and respondents' expectations regarding which choice
alternatives are realistic or relevant (Louviere et al. (2000); Louviere (2006)).
3 For example Adamowicz et al. (1997) and Poor et al. (2001) compare WTP estimates from choice
models that use both objectively measured and subjectively perceived levels of attributes. Experimental
economists (e.g. Plott and Zeiler (2005)) have examined the role of subjective beliefs in explaining the
gap between WTP and willingness to accept (WTA).
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When confronted with unrealistic or irrelevant choice scenarios, respondents
may issue protest responses. Scenario rejection may lead a respondent to state that they
prefer the status quo alternative, but they do this for reasons that have nothing to do
with their preferences or the constraints they face (or they may refuse to make any
choice at all). This behavior may indicate merely that they doubt the viability of the
hypothetical product or proposed program, rather than implying that they would not
value it if it were guaranteed to be as advertised.4 When some choices may be protest
responses or belie some type of scenario rejection, then, it is important to distinguish
these from "good" responses (although in practice it can be difficult to draw these
distinctions).5 Bateman et al. (2006) suggest several methods to identify these protest
responses such as follow-up questions about why respondents answered the way they
did. Strazzera et al. (2003) also offer possible corrections for selection bias caused by
protest zeroes in contingent valuation studies.
Instead of outright scenario rejection, we address the phenomenon of scenario
adjustment-where respondents find one or more of the attributes of the stated
alternatives to be somewhat implausible but this problem does not derail the choice
process entirely. Instead, the individuals may implicitly replace one or more of these
implausible stated attributes with something that they deem more plausible and then
4 For a more detailed description of protest responses and protest bids, see Bateman et al. (2002) and
Champ et al. (2003). Rejection of the proposed payment vehicle (e.g. a tax or a user fee) can be another
form of protest.
5 Even in real choice situations, a consumer may choose not to buy a product simply because the seller's
claims about it seem "too good to be true." If the consumer could verify the product's qualities, however,
they would actually make the purchase. This suggests that scenario rejection (and scenario adjustment)
may thus be fairly common in real markets, too.
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make their decisions based on these mental edits to the choice set. Outright scenario
rejection may be difficult enough to detect, but scenario adjustment-which is a matter
of degree, rather than an all-or-nothing proposition-may be more insidious and
therefore even more difficult to detect. Debriefing questions asked after respondents
make the key choice(s) can be invaluable for this purpose.
SP researchers have long realized the potential for debriefing questions to help
them understand the perceptions of the respondent during the choice process. A handful
of researchers have already used specific debriefing questions for detection of scenario
adjustment. Carson et al. (1994) ask subjects whether they believed that the pollutants
in question could actually cause the environmental problems stated in the choice
scenario and whether they believed that natural processes would return things to normal
within the stated number of years. When respondents said they did not believe the
stated natural recovery time, they were asked if they thought the true recovery time was
more or less than the stated time. In a similar vein, Viscusi and Huber (2006) ask their
respondents for subjective assessments of the probability that the program in question
will actually produce the advertised benefits.6
Researchers should put forth their best effort to make the choice scenarios in a
stated preference survey as plausible as possible, for as many respondents as possible.
Despite their best efforts, however, it may be impossible for researchers to fully
anticipate the likely credibility of all dimensions of a randomized choice scenario from
6 Burghart et al. (2007) extend a random utility model to include estimated scenario adjustment
parameters that capture whether respondents appear to believe and/or pay attention to certain key
attributes of alternatives in the choice set, conditional on the functional form of the choice model.
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the perspective of every individual who might participate in the survey. The best
strategy to deal with any residual scenario adjustments may be for researchers to
anticipate that this behavior is inevitable in some proportion of cases and to plan for the
option to assess and correct for it. This chapter illustrates how some carefully worded
debriefing questions can be used to measure the approximate extent of one type of
scenario adjustment. The econometric model controls for these scenario adjustments,
and counterfactual simulations can then be used to infer what would be the estimated
preferences (and hence WTP) had each individual in the sample fully accepted these key
dimensions of the stated choice scenario.
3. Available Choice Data
Existing market-based data are not adequate to infer individuals' demands for
risk reductions with respect to future time profiles of illness or injury. The revealed
preference (RP) data which are most typically used concern tradeoffs between on-the-
job fatality risks and wages. More-dangerous jobs tend to involve a wage premium, so
workers' choices among jobs with different risk levels and different wages provide an
indication of how much money those workers are willing to forego for risk reductions.
There are dozens of empirical studies concerning the job choices of labor market
participants. However, groups other than working-aged males may not be represented
very well by these measures. This may be problematic because the amounts people are
willing to pay for prospective risk reductions may vary considerably by gender, age,
and labor market status. For example, stay-at-home mothers of young children may be
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especially under-represented in wage-risk studies. For any group which is not in the
labor market, stated preference (SP) data can be one of the few viable sources of rich
information concerning willingness to pay for prospective health risk reductions.
Cameron and DeShazo (2008) use stated preference methods to elicit
preferences for programs to reduce the risk of morbidity and mortality in a general
population sample of adults in the United States. The survey was developed carefully
using 36 detailed in-person cognitive interviews, three pretests and a large pilot study.
Knowledge Networks, Inc. administered the survey to 2,439 of their panelists and
achieved a respectable 79% response rate.? In brief, the survey consists offive
modules. The first module asks respondents to rate their subjective risks, from low to
high, of contracting each of a range of major illnesses or injuries. Individuals are also
asked to think about how lifestyle changes would reduce their risks of these illnesses
and how difficult it might be to implement these lifestyle changes.
The second module in the survey is a detailed tutorial that explains the concept
of an "illness profile" to be summarized in the upcoming choice sets. An illness profile
is a description of a sequence of future health states associated with a major illness or
injury that the respondent may face over his or her remaining lifetime. The major and
potentially life-threatening illnesses which are described in the survey are labeled as one
of five specific types of cancer (breast cancer for women, prostate cancer for men, plus
lung cancer, colon cancer, and skin cancer), heart attack, heart disease, stroke,
7For more information on the survey instrument and the data, see Cameron and DeShazo (2008). For
more detail on the survey, please see an aImotated sample at:
http://www.uoregon.edu/-cameron/vsl/Annotated_survey_DeShazo_Cameron.pdf .
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respiratory illness, diabetes, traffic accident, or Alzheimer's disease. An illness profile
includes the years before the individual becomes sick (i.e. the latency period), illness-
years while the individual is sick, any recovered/remission years if the individual
survives the illness or injury, and lost life-years if the individual dies earlier than he
would have in the absence of the illness or injury. After the tutorial about illness
profiles, the individual is informed that he or she might soon be able to purchase new
programs that would reduce the risks of experiencing certain illness profiles. Each
illness-related risk-reduction program described in the survey consists of a diagnostic
blood test plus possible drug therapies and/or life-style changes, available at a specified
overall cost that is not covered by insurance. 8
The third, and key, module of each survey involves a set of five different three-
alternative conjoint choice experiments where the individual is asked to choose between
two possible health risk reducing programs and a status quo alternative. The part of the
survey that is of interest here are the debriefing questions.
Each choice exercise is immediately followed by a set of debriefing questions
designed to help the researcher understand the individual's reasons for their particular
choice. Some debriefing questions depend on the alternative chosen by the respondent.
For example, there are various perfectly legitimate economic reasons why individuals
8 Early drafts of the survey made an effort to spell out that the quoted costs were intended to capture all of
the monetized opportunity costs of participating in the program, but this additional material had to be cut
to keep the survey within its length restrictions. An anonymous referee has suggested that we consider
respondents' subjective perceptions about how easy it would be to improve their health habits.
Respondents who would find it harder to make life-style changes have larger coefficients on their net
income variable, which could be taking up the effect of what is instead just a larger value of perceived net
income (Le. smaller perceived program costs). Thus respondents do not, on average, appear to be
imputing significantly larger full costs than are stated in the choice scenarios.
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may prefer the status quo-including that they cannot afford either of the risk-reduction
programs which are described, they would rather spend money on other things, or they
believe they will be affected by another illness before they contract either illness stated
in the scenario. If respondents choose the status quo, they are asked why "Neither
Program" is their preferred alternative. Included among these possible reasons are
some that reveal the presence of scenario rejection, such as "I did not believe the
programs would work."
Other debriefing questions are asked regardless of which alternative the
individual selects. One key question, shown in Figure 2, is "Around when do you think
you would begin to value highly the risk reduction benefits of each program?" We
interpret this question as being equivalent to the question "When do you think the
program's benefits will start?" The benefit of the program is clearly defined on an
earlier page of the survey as a reduction in the risk of suffering from the specified major
illness or injury starting at the age stated in the scenario. This question is of great
interest in this chapter since it essentially asks the individual about the latency period
they used to answer the question. If the respondent fully accepts the stated scenario,
then the age at which the scenario states the benefits start should probably match the
age at which the respondent believes the benefits will start.
4. Empirical Specification
This empirical specification used in this dissertation builds off the model
presented by Cameron and DeShazo (2008). In that paper, it is established that stated
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choices in this general population sample appear to be best explained by a model that
involves expected discounted utility stemming from durations in different adverse
future health states. To permit systematically varying diminishing marginal utilities of
net income, utility is not modeled simply as additively separable, but instead as
quadratic, in present discounted expected net income.
To understand the basic model, consider just a pair-wise choice between
Program A and the status-quo alternative (N).9 If individual i chooses the status quo
alternative, then let rr~s be the probability of suffering a given adverse health profile
(i.e. getting "sick"). The expected discounted utility is:
PDV (E [v;Nn = PDV (rr~SV;NS +(1- rr~S)V;NH)
If the individual, i, chooses Program A, however, then the probability of
suffering the adverse health profile is lower. Let rr~s be the (reduced) probability of
suffering this adverse health profile if Program A is chosen, and since ~I1~s is the risk
reduction to be achieved by choosing Program A, ~I1~s is negative. Then we can write
the expected utility from choosing Program A as:
PDV (E [V;A]) =PDV (I1~SV;AS +(1_I1~S)V;AH)
The difference in the present discounted expected utility when an individual chooses
Program A instead of the status quo is:
MDV[Es,H(V/)] =PDV[Es,H(VjA)]- PDV[Es,H(V;N)] (1)
9 The model for a three-way choice between two alternative programs and the status quo is analogous.
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The sequence of health states making up the illness profile to be addressed by
Program A is captured by a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive (0, 1) indicator
variables associated with each future time period, t: l(prei~) for pre-illness years,
l(illt) for illness-years, l(rcvi~) for recovered or post-illness years, and l(lyl;~) for life-
years lost. Individuals are modeled as expecting to pay the annual cost ofthe risk
reduction program only during pre-illness and recovered years, but not if they are sick
or dead.
Define the discount rate as r and let gt = (l + rr t . The present discounted
number of years making up the remainder of the individual's nominal life expectancy,
1;, is given by pdvct
A
= L~~l gt . Future health states are discounted and summed from
t =1 to t =1; and are denoted pdve: =L gt l(prei~)' pdviiA=L gt l(illi~) ,
pdvr/ =L gt l(rcvi~) and pdvl/ =L gt l(lyli~)' Since the different health states
exhaust the individual's nominal life expectancy,
pdvet + pdV(A + pdvr/ + pdvliA=pdvct .
To accommodate the assumption that each individual expects to pay program
costs only during the pre-illness or recovered (post-illness) periods,
pdvp: = pdve: + pdvr/ is the present discounted time over which payments must be
made. This can be interpreted as the expected discounted duration of program costs,
with the expectation taken across whether or not the individual gets sick.
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To simplify notation we define cterm: =[(1- rr:s)pdvct +rr:spdvp:] , where
ctermj
A can be intuitively explained as the expected number of present discounted years
over which the program costs will be paid if the individual chooses Program A. We also
define yterm jA=[-pdVCiA+rr:spdV(AS +rr~s pdvlt] even though ytermt does not have
an easy intuitive explanation and we use it only to simplify the notation below. The
expected utility-difference that drives the individual's choice between Program A and
the status quo can then be defined as lO :
flPDV[ES,H (V/)] =Po{(Y; - c:)cterm: +Y;yterm:}
+PI {(Y; - ct)2 ctermjA+ y;2 ytermjA} (2)
+al {flrr:spdviiA}+a2{flrr:spdV'iA} +a 3{flrr:spdvliA}+cjA
The terms in braces in equation (2) can be constructed from the data, given specific
assumptions about the discount rate. 11
In the sense of Graham (1981), the option price for a risk-reduction program is
the maximum common certain payment that makes the individual just indifferent
between paying for the program (and enjoying the risk reduction) and not paying for the
10 Where there will be an analogous term for the utility difference between Program B and the status quo
in our three-alternative model.
11 In this paper, we assume a common discount rate of 5%. Cameron and DeShazo (2008) explore the
consequences of assuming either a 3% discount rate or a 7% discount rate. Work in progress also
involves the estimation of individual-specific discount rates simultaneously with these stated choices
concerning health risk reduction programs, using additional data on intertemporal choices by a separate
sample of respondents from the same population.
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program (and not enjoying the risk reduction). 12 The annual option price CiA that makes
the expression in equation (2) exactly zero can be calculated as:
(3)
Where feY) = (flo +!1.Y;)Y; = floY; + flly;2 , so that f- I(-) is the solution to a quadratic
combination of the present discounted health states in the illness profile.
The expected present value of this stream of payments must be calculated over
the individual's remaining nominal lifespan:
(4)
To convert this expected present-value option price into a measure of the WTP for a
microrisk reduction-a richer variant of the more-familiar "value of a statistical life"
(VSL)-one can normalize arbitrarily on a one-in-one-million risk change by dividing
this WTP by the absolute size of the risk reduction and scaling by .000001 to produce:
E [PV(AA)]
WTP = SoH A Ci ·*0.000001
m i
(5)
The WTP depends on the entire illness profile and upon all of the parameters in
equation (2).
As described in Cameron and DeShazo (2008), the data suggest that the basic,
homogeneous-preferences model given in equation (2) is dominated by a specification
12 This notion of an option price differs from the sense in which is customarily used in the finance
literature.
---- ----------------
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that is not merely linear in the terms involving present discounted health-state years.
We can rewrite the terms in equation (2) that involve the a coefficients. Let j =A, B,
N, and pdvX jN =0 for X =i, r, I. Then:
(6)
The simple linear specification fails to explain respondents' observed choices as well as
a model that employs shifted logarithms of the pdvX/ terms.
Starting from a form that is fully translog (including all squares and pairwise
interaction terms for the three log terms), and retaining only those terms where the a
coefficients are statistically significantly different from zero, equation (6) becomes:
(7)
Finally, because the opportunity for longer durations in each health state is correlated
with the youth of the respondent, the a coefficients must be allowed to differ
systematically with the respondent's current age wherever this generalization is
warranted by the data. This leads to a model where a3 =a30 +a31 age j + a3zage j
Z
, and
analogously for a4 and as' This quadratic-in-age systematic variation in parameters
permits non-constant age profiles for the model's WTP estimates, and this sample tends
to produce the fairly typical higher values during middle age and lower values for
younger and older respondents.
33
Since respondents choose between Program A, Program B, or neither program,
the Random Utility Model (RUM) is the best theoretical framework to use. We assume
that individuals will choose the option that gives them the most expected utility. Since
we are analyzing risk reductions, we could choose to use a framework of prospect
theory, which takes into account that individuals tend to overestimate the likelihood of
very small probabilities and underestimate the likelihood of very large probabilities.
Since the risk associated with our programs do not vary from 0 to 1, but instead are
concentrated at the small end of the spectrum, we think using a random utility model is
the preferred way to frame the model.
As noted in the description of the survey instrument, after each choice scenario,
respondents are asked debriefing questions about when they believe that the benefits of
each proposed program would begin, for them personally. Based on the answers to each
of the questions in Figure 2, we define two variables. First, l(nevel/) is an indicator
variable that takes a value of one if the individual responds by checking "Never
(Program would not benefit me)." The second variable, Bendiff/ ' is an approximately
continuous variable defined as the "minimum overestimate of the latency," which
measures the latency until the individual believes the benefits will begin.
The variable Bendiff/ requires a more detailed explanation. If the interval
checked in the question in Figure 2 contains the stated latency for the illness from the
corresponding choice scenario, then BendijJ/ =O. The relationship between the chosen
interval and the stated latency is thus something like that shown in Part A of Figure 3.
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In this case, the time when benefits begin (in the opinion of the respondent) is
essentially the same as the latency stated in the choice scenario. In contrast,
Bendiff/ has a positive value equal to the difference between the lower bound of the
checked time interval and the stated latency if that checked interval lies entirely above
the stated latency for that illness in the choice scenario, like the outcome shown in Part
B of Figure 3. Bendiff/ has a negative value equal to the difference between the upper
bound of the checked interval if the checked interval lies entirely below the stated
latency, as illustrated in Part C of Figure 3. In Appendices Band C, the relationships
between each of the two scenario adjustment variables are explored and an array of
explanatory variables specific either to the individual or to the choice scenario.
The usual intent within a stated preference study is to induce individuals to
accept the stated choice scenario as fully as possible and for them to respond
conditional on that acceptance. If respondents selectively reinterpret the question (i.e.
adjust the choice scenario) before they answer, then this violates an important
maintained hypothesis behind the random utility model that produces the utility
parameter estimates which are the foundation of most stated preference studies. We use
the "observed" values of l(nevel/) and Bendiff/ constructed from the debriefing
questions associated with each of the 15,040 illness profiles presented to the
respondents to control and correct for scenario adjustment with respect to the latency
attribute. Descriptive statistics for the variables used in these models are presented in
Table 1.
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We accommodate scenario adjustment by allowing each of the utility parameters
in the baseline model to differ systematically with individuals' responses to the
debriefing questions about whether and when the benefits from each health risk
reduction program are likely to be realized. The working version of the general model
involves a total of fourteen parameters- flo and A which capture the marginal utility
of net income (i.e. expenditure on all other goods and services), the five basic a
parameters (aIO ' a2O' a 30 , a 40 , a so ) appearing in the illness profile term in expression (7)
above, plus the three pairs of coefficients on the age; and age;2 terms that shift a3, a4
and as' and the single coefficient on the sample participation probability interaction
term, a!3'
To effect corrections for scenario adjustment, the two scenario adjustment
variables, l(nevel/) and Bendiff/ ' are allowed to shift everyone of these fourteen
utility parameters. If each of these parameters is represented generically as (), the new
model substitutes a systematically varying parameter as follows: 13
(8)
for a total of 52 parameters in the fully generalized specification. 14
13 In a set of preliminary models, both I(never,i) and a pair of indicator variables for over- or
underestimation (relative to none) to shift each of the a parameters in the general model are employed.
The results were qualitatively similar to those reported here.
14 Results for these fully generalized 52-parameter models are contained in Appendix C.
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5. Empirical Results
In Table 2, however, we report results for a parsimonious version that retains
only those shift variables which are individually statistically significant,I5 Model I in
Table 2 gives the utility parameter estimates which result when the possibility of
scenario adjustment is completely ignored during estimation. Model 2 in the same table
(which spans columns 2 through 4) reveals the results when scenario adjustment is
accommodated. The ideal situation (i.e. full acceptance of the stated latency of
benefits) corresponds to l(neveJ/) =0 and Bendiff/ =0 for all respondents and all
programs. Thus, we label the first column of parameters for Model 2 as "Corrected,"
since these are the estimated utility parameters which apply when both l(neveJ/) and
Bendiff/ are equal to zero-i.e. when we simulate counterfactually the latency
scenarios that the survey had intended each respondent to accept.
In Model 2, where we measure and correct for scenario adjustment, the
magnitudes of some of the shift parameters are striking. The second column of results
for Model 2 shows the significant shifts in each of these utility parameters when the
respondent states that they will never benefit from the program in question. The third
column shows the significant shifts in these parameters for a one-unit increase
in Bendiff/ .
l5 We acknowledge that these variables may be, to some extent, jointly endogenous with the underlying
willingness to pay for health risk reductions because they are reported by the same individuals. In
Appendix B, we note that despite the considerable number of statistically significant coefficients in the
models to explain Bendiff/ ' we are only able to explain (at best) about 35% of its variation across illness
profiles using the large number of explanatory variables that are available.
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The marginal utility of income from Model 2 serves as the denominator in the
marginal rate of substitution (between each illness profile attribute and income) that
gives the estimated marginal willingness to pay associated with each attribute.
Overestimation of the latency appears to be associated with a higher estimated marginal
utility of income, which means a lower WTP. The perception that a particular program
will never benefit the respondent also appears to undo the evidence for a diminishing
marginal utility of income. For these cases, WTP is no longer greater at higher incomes,
whereas this appears to be the case when respondents fully accept the stated latencies.
There are also a number of important differences for "scenario adjusters" among
the coefficients on the illness profile terms. In two cases (for the linear term in the
shifted log of discounted sick years, and for the interaction term between the shifted
logs of discounted sick-years and discounted lost life-years), the discrete shift in the
parameter associated with the perception that the program will never provide any
benefit is sufficient to completely change the sign of the effect. In two other cases, the
sign of the coefficient remains the same but the coefficient more than doubles in size.
Whenever the coefficients on the interaction terms involving Bendiff/ are statistically
significant, they bear a sign that is opposite to the baseline coefficient on the same term.
Scenario adjustments can thus have a clearly discernible impact upon estimated
marginal utilities.
The magnitudes of the shift parameters reported for Model 2 in Table 2 appear
fairly large, but to appreciate the overall effects of these parameter changes on demand
estimates, it is necessary to simulate distributions for the implied (normalized)
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willingness-to-pay estimates. Bear in mind that the U.S. EPA, for example, relies upon
an overall average value of a statistical life (a VSL associated with sudden death in the
current period) of about $6 million, whereas for transportation policies, the VSL
numbers typically used are closer to $3 million. In Table 3, we show selected WTP
estimates for specified individuals and conditions. We consider, in succession, an
individual who is 30, 45, or 60 years old. In all cases, the individual earns an income of
$42,000 per year. The illness profiles involve shorter (and longer) illnesses with
"recovery," shorter (and longer) illnesses followed by death, and sudden death with no
preceding period of illness. The "sudden death" WTP estimates are most comparable to
conventional VSL estimates. 16
Scenario adjustment in this illustration concerns illness latency, so two different
illness profiles are considered, one without latency and one with a latency period. We
want to compare the WTP estimates that are corrected and uncorrected in each illness
profile. Then we also want to compare the direction and magnitude of the differences
between conected and uncorrected between the two illness profiles. Since this scenario
adjustment involves latency, there may be differences due to the length of the latency
period.
In the first pair of columns in Table 3, we specify that each illness commences
immediately (i.e. with no latency period). In the second pair, we specify a latency
16 The illnesses described in the choice scenarios are all major illnesses, including most of the ailments
from which people eventually die. It is clear from the analysis that people do not assume that their health
status "after" one of these illnesses, should they recover, will be equivalent to their pre-illness state. Thus
the value of avoiding a one-year major illness includes the value of avoiding the ensuing post-illness
health state. It will not be the same as the value of avoiding just that year of illness, separate from any
ensuing years in an incompletely recovered state.
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period of twenty years. In each pair of columns, the initial uncorrected WTP estimates
are calculated from the uncorrected parameters of Model 1 in Table 2. The corrected
WTP numbers are calculated using the baseline coefficients from Model 2 in Table 2,
which have been corrected for any scenario adjustments reported by respondents.
Table 3 shows that for the "No Latency" illness profiles, the corrected WTP
estimates are mostly higher than those produced by the model that does not take
scenario adjustment into account. The most dramatic differences are for longer and fatal
illnesses for 60-year-olds, where the uncorrected model suggests a WTP of less than $1,
whereas the corrected estimate is $6.93. The only exceptions (where the corrected
estimates are lower than the uncorrected estimates) are for some of the illnesses which
are not fatal. The difference in the corrected and uncorrected WTP estimates suggests
that if scenario adjustment is not taken into account, willingness to pay estimates for
many illness profiles of this type may be biased downward. This type of bias may
result in the recommendation that some programs or policies that reduce illnesses and
injuries with no latency (i.e. where benefits start immediately) should not be
implemented when it may actually be welfare-increasing to put these measures into
effect.
In contrast, the corrected estimates for illness profiles that have a latency of 20
years are almost all lower than the uncorrected estimates. The 90% simulated
distributions for these WTP measures often include zero. The only two anomalies,
where the corrected estimates are higher, are for the non-fatal illness profiles for 30-
year-olds. This suggests that failure to take into account scenario adjustment could
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cause some programs or policies that address long-latency health risks to be
implemented when they are not actually welfare-enhancing from the current perspective
of most age groups. These differences in the corrected and uncorrected WTP estimates
show how important it may be to acknowledge and correct for scenario adjustments in
stated preference research.
6. Conclusion
The absence of suitable market data sometimes forces researchers to use stated
preference methods to assess demand for fundamentally non-market (or pre-test-
market) goods or services. Given economists' skepticism about the reliability of stated
preference data, researchers in fields where adequate market data tend to be scarce have
systematically addressed many recognized problems with these alternative demand-
measurement methodologies. One problem with SP research has been the occurrence of
protest responses or scenario rejection, where respondents completely refuse to play
along with the hypothetical choice exercise because they do not believe (or agree with)
some aspect of the choice scenario. This chapter addresses the related but potentially
more subtle problem of scenario adjustment. Respondents make the stated choices
requested of them, but they first implicitly revise the choice scenario to better capture
what would be the implications of each alternative in their own particular case.
Scenario adjustment may be more likely in situations where the alternatives
involved in the choice problem are less easy to perceive and appreciate. For example, it
may be possible to describe, unambiguously, the relevant attributes of alternative brands
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of dishwashing soap, in which case scenario adjustment would be unlikely. In contrast,
it may be very difficult to completely describe the relevant attributes of a program to
enhance the survival of an endangered species, where even the experts cannot predict
for certain whether the program will be effective. Choices that involve heterogeneous
risks or uncertain outcomes, such as the reduction of health risks, may be the most
vulnerable to scenario adjustment, since there is great variability in how different
people perceive risks and uncertainty.
Assessment and correction for scenario adjustment is easier and can be more
systematic if suitable debriefing questions about each key choice scenario are posed in
the survey. The specific debriefing question used in the empirical illustration in this
chapter is very useful, but it may still have been less than ideal. Carefully planned
questions of this type, however, can help the researcher identify those individuals who
acknowledge that they do not believe that the preceding choice scenario, exactly as
stated, applies to them. Where possible, debriefing questions can also be used to
quantify the likely extent to which individuals may have adjusted the scenario. With
information about the extent of scenario adjustments, researchers can explicitly model
the effects of scenario adjustment on the estimated utility parameters in their choice
models. This allows counterfactual simulations of the individual's most likely response,
had they answered the question exactly as it was asked. These types of simulations,
with systematic correction for scenario adjustment, presumably permit more accurate
estimates of demand.
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In this chapter, using just one example of a debriefing question of this type in a
stated preference survey concerning willingness to pay for privately provided health
risk reduction programs, we construct two variables to quantify scenario adjustment.
One is a binary variable that is equal to one if the respondent reports that the program in
question will never benefit them. The second variable is a lower bound on how much
the respondent may have overestimated (or underestimated) the latency period before
the benefits of the program would begin to accrue (relative to the latency that is
identified in the stated preference choice scenario). When both of these variables are
zero, of course, scenario adjustment is implied not to be present.
The data used in this study suggest that some individuals may indeed update
some aspects of choice scenarios so that these scenarios better apply to their own
personal situations. We use an empirical choice model that allows the utility parameter
estimates to differ systematically according to the respondent's reports of possible
scenario adjustment with respect to latency periods. The estimation results show that the
counterfactually simulated WTP-type benefits estimates--eorrected for scenario
adjustment-are often noticeably different from the uncorrected estimates. For
example, the empirical estimates suggest that after correction for scenario adjustments,
programs that benefit people now have mainly higher estimates, while programs that
benefit people twenty years into the future have mainly lower estimates. These
differences in estimated demands are big enough that they could potentially make the
difference between enacting a policy that is warranted on a benefit-cost criterion and
failing to enact it.
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Given these findings and the differences in demand estimates (with and without
correction) in this illustration, we infer that scenario adjustment is likely to be inevitable
and potentially influential, in at least some proportion of cases, in many other
applications as well. Debriefing questions to permit assessment and correction of
scenario adjustment should probably be a regular feature of SP surveys. Likewise,
formal modeling of scenario adjustment and its impact on the final estimates of interest
should probably be a routine component of empirical work using stated preferences.
Researchers should at least report sensitivity analyses for their main results with respect
to this type of correction. Such information would allow the policy-makers to decide
which types of "misalignments" between respondent and researcher information sets
warrant correction, and therefore which demand estimates should be preferred.
In the next two chapters, we turn from methodological improvements toward
looking at how WTP varies systematically. In the next chapter we examine differences
by household structure. In Chapter IV, we examine differences in WTP by type of
disease.
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CHAPTER III
WILLINGNESS TO PAY AND HOUSEHOLD STRUCTURE
A version of this chapter is co-authored with Trudy Ann Cameron and J.R. DeShazo
1. Introduction
Parents can choose to invest in their own health and in the health of their
children. Both market goods and parental attention are important for the health of the
child. Therefore, these own-health investments that allow parents to work and care for
their children may also be seen as investments in the health of the child. Jacobson
(2000) developed a theoretical model of family-provided health to more fully explain
the determinants and dynamics of health investments in adults and children. In her
model, investments in each family member's health are jointly determined by the
allocation of income and time made by other family members. We conduct an
empirical test of the hypothesis that a family may change its investment in the health of
a parent in order to benefit the children and we provide estimates of the willingness to
pay to reduce risks and how they vary depending on household structure.
We further contribute to the literature on the family's role in the production of
health by exploring several other questions which are raised, but not answered, by
existing theoretical models. For example, we describe how the likely timing of a
parents' future adverse health states, interacted with the anticipated timing of their
children's departure from home, can affect the parents' current investments in
mitigation of their own health risks. We also assess empirically how parents'
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willingness to pay to reduce their own health risks will vary with the numbers of
children in different age brackets in the household and across single-income and dual-
income households.
Researchers have, of course, looked at many empirical aspects of child health
more generally, and at parents' willingness to pay for improvements in the health of .
their children. I? Numerous studies also explore a parent's propensity to invest in their
children's health by reducing the child's risk of illness or death through improved
access to medications and better safety measures. Among these, Uu et al. (2000) focus
on Taiwanese mothers' willingness to pay to reduce the duration and severity of a cold
for themselves and their children, and Jenkins et al. (2002) focus on parents'
willingness to pay for safer bicycle helmets for their children. 18 Evans et al. (2006)
examine how individual preferences for public policy changes are influenced by the
time spent on the care of a dependent (e.g. an elderly parent or a child). Dockins et al.
(2002) and Scapecchi (2006) both address the question of whether there are differences
in willingness to pay to reduce health risks for children versus adults. Our work differs
from these prior studies because we focus on adults' willingness to pay for health-risk
reductions for themselves as a function of the presence of children of different ages.
17 Some examples from the child health literature are Currie and Hotz (2004), who find that a requirement
of more education for day-care providers leads to fewer accidents involving the children in their care.
Currie and Moretti (2003) find that an increase in a mother's education Will, among other things, improve
the health of her infants. Currie and Neidell (2005) and Chay and Greenstone (2003) look at the
measurable negative effects of air pollution on infant health.
180ther examples include Agee and Crocker (1996); Barron et al. (2004); Chenevier and LeLorier
(2005); Dickie (2005); Dickie and Gerking (2006); Dickie and Gerking (2007); Dickie and Messman
(2004) and Maguire et al. (2004) .
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Our analysis also contributes to the literature concerned with estimation of the
"value of a statistical life" (VSL). Since not all readers may be familiar with the concept
of a statistical life, we digress to explain this concept. A VSL is an average, scaled
willingness to pay (WTP) to reduce mortality risk. Estimates of individuals' WTP are
based on small reductions in mortality risks. The decrease in mortality risk may come
from many sources including increased access to medicines and disease prevention.
Each available estimate typically corresponds to a different-sized risk reduction, so it is
not possible to average the underlying unsealed WTP estimates. Thus, WTP estimates
need to be standardized on some common size of risk reduction before an average can
be taken. The convention is to use the ratio of the marginal utility of a risk reduction to
the marginal utility of income (a marginal rate of substitution), which is equivalent to
scaling all of these tiny risk reductions and their corresponding WTP estimates to a
vastly larger 1.00 risk change. (It is tempting to interpret this risk reduction as "avoiding
certain death" but no such extreme risk reduction is valued in any of the empirical data
on WTP and no risk change as big as 1.00 is contemplated in any policy context where
these values are used.) The average of a set of scaled-up WTP estimates is termed the
"value of a statistical life." For use in benefit-cost analyses, however, the VSL is scaled
right back down to the very tiny individual risk reductions represented by most health,
environmental, and safety regulations.
The U.S. EPA, for example, uses a VSL value of roughly $6-$7 million for a
normalized risk change of 1.00. Viscusi and Aldy (2003) offer a meta-analysis of
various VSL estimates found in the literature in the past thirty years and discuss how
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estimates are used by governments to balance the costs and benefits of policies they
may implement. Their meta-analysis reveals the extent of uncertainty in the accuracy of
the point estimates, econometric problems, and variations in the estimates derived for
different age groups. This literature, however, does not consider how the VSL of an
adult may vary in the presence of children, so the main contribution of this chapter is to
show how WTP varies along this dimension.
Using a model developed in Cameron and DeShazo (2008), we depart from a
simple VSL and work with the more general concept of the willingness to pay for a
microrisk reduction. Like the VSL, this WTP is constructed from a ratio of the marginal
utility of a risk reduction to the marginal utility of income, but in our case, the marginal
utility of a risk reduction is a much richer construct since we are able to capture
differences in types of risk and differences stemming from heterogeneity in the
demographics of the affected population. A methodological advantage of our approach
is that we are able to estimate the adult's marginal utility of income as well as separate
(and non-constant) marginal disutilities of future periods of illness and years of lost life.
Given our utility-theoretic modeling framework, we are able to describe how each of
these marginal utilities varies systematically for mothers and fathers with children in
different age groups. We provide the first documentation of how adult willingness to
pay to reduce the risk of adverse health profiles differs significantly for parents and
non-parents. We show how estimates of the WTP differ for mothers and fathers. We
illustrate how a mother's or a father's WTP varies systematically with the numbers of
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children in different age groups presently in the household, and we show how WTP
differs across single-income and dual-income households.
To preview briefly the survey data we use, we note here that our data are drawn
from an extensive existing stated preference survey by Cameron and DeShazo (2008)
that elicits individuals' demands for programs that reduce their risks of eleven different
major health threats. The illnesses are described as a time sequence of health states that
the individual has some risk of facing over their remaining lifetime. The risk-reducing
intervention programs are described as an annual pin-prick diagnostic blood test and, if
needed, associated drug therapies and life-style changes. The estimating sample
consists of choices by over 1,800 individuals who are representative of the U.S.
population in terms of standard demographic characteristics. In addition to thorough
pre-testing of the survey, extensive robustness and validity checks of the individuals'
responses have been conducted. These include risk comprehension verification and
scope tests for WTP values. Individuals are given "cheap talk" reminders, where they
are told to carefully consider their budget constraints, in order to mitigate hypothetical
bias. Each choice set consists of a pair of risk reduction programs and a status quo
alternative. Individuals are instructed to assume each choice set is independent of the
other four choice sets they are asked to consider. We use these data to empirically test
hypotheses about parents' investments in their own health.
Early theoretical models of the family, such as Becker and Tomes (1976) and
Leibowitz (1974), focus on parents' investments in their children rather than in
themselves. However, parents' investments in their own health may represent indirect
49
investments in the well-being of an individual's children. Jacobson (2000) recently
developed a theoretical model of family-provided health to more fully explain
determinants of health investments in both adults and children. By treating the family,
instead of the individual, as the producer of health, she illustrates how investments in
each family member's health are jointly determined by the allocation of income and
time made by other family members. 19 The health of a child is determined both by the
family's allocation of market goods to the child and by its allocation of health-
denominated parental time to the child. Consequently, we would expect that utility-
maximizing parents explicitly consider the role that their own health plays in
determining the health and human capital development of their children. Jacobson also
shows that parents do not have to be altruistic to invest. Even parents who are entirely
selfish (e.g. those who do not appear to derive utility directly from the happiness of
their child) will invest in the health of that child since failing to do so may have
negative consequences for parents' incomes (e.g. a sick child may reduce the time a
parent may allocate to the labor market or to consumption activities).
The model by Jacobson (2000) shows that family members, instead of
equalizing health outcomes for each family member, equalize the marginal utility of
lifetime health normalized by the price of health for that family member. It also shows
that health influences income in two separate ways-good health allows a parent to
work and good health increases the parent's wage rate. Since children require both
income and time from a parent, we expect the presence of children to affect parental
19 Jacobson extends Grossman (1972) who models the individual as the producer of health.
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decisions in two ways. We expect children to increase a parent's marginal utility of
income since the additional costs of caring for children will make the family budget
tighter. We also expect children to increase a parent's marginal utility of healthy time
since time spent in all pursuits becomes more valuable at the margin as the parent needs
healthy time both to care for a child and to work. Thus, the model implies the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Parents' marginal utilities from both income and healthy time
are higher in the presence of children and may continue to increase with
additional children.
Jacobson's model assumes that both parents have common preferences, but she
admits that this assumption may not be realistic. Jacobson's model was extended by
Bolin et al. (2001), Bolin et al. (2002a) and·Bolin et al. (2002b) who hypothesize that a
family's investments in the health of the mother, versus that of the father, will be
different and will depend on their relative labor market opportunity costs, among other
things. They highlight the way in which mothers' and fathers' investments in their own
health can vary as a result of intra-household decision-making and Nash bargaining
between husband and wife. To explain differences in men's and women's willingness
to pay, these models illuminate the roles of several factors that may vary systematically
across husbands and wives. Specifically, these factors include labor market opportunity
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costs, the marginal utility of health improvement, and the marginal productivity of the
parent's healthy time for the child's development,2o This suggests the following:
Hypothesis 2: If a woman earns a lower income and/or derives greater marginal
utility from additional income and faces relatively lower (and longer-latency)
health risks than her husband, she may be less willing to pay to reduce the risk
of getting sick or dying in the near term.
If the inter-parent allocation process is an outcome of Nash bargaining, Bolin et
al. (2002b) suggests each parent's control over family income may have an impact upon
their own health investments. Each parent's degree of control over how income is
allocated may depend in part upon both the share of total household income earned by
that parent and the leverage generated from the threat of a possible exit from the
household. (If the wife has her own income, for example, a husband's threat of exit
from the marriage has smaller financial consequences for her.) This suggests the
following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3 (Second Income): Women who have independent incomes will be
both more inclined and more able to invest in reducing their own health risks
than will women who depend entirely upon their husbands' incomes.
We also expect willingness to pay for health-risk reductions to differ with
changes in a parent's age. Although there is no definite consensus of how VSL changes
with age, Viscusi and Aldy (2003) construct VSL estimates and find that VSL tends to
20 The child's health is also determined by efficiency parameters for both the mother and father. See
equation (22) on p. 622 of Jacobson (2000).
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increase with age until individuals reach their mid-50's and then tends to decrease?1 In
the context of our study, we control for the age of the adult when evaluating willingness
to pay for health-risk reductions in order to distinguish between the effect of the
parents' ages and the effects of parenthood status and the ages of children.
The next section briefly outlines the survey methods and the available data. The
third section explains the structural model behind the empirical specifications. Sections
4 and 5 discuss the empirical estimation and simulated WTP results and Section 6
concludes.
2. Available Choice Data
Existing market-based data are not adequate to infer individuals' demands for
risk reductions with respect to future time profiles of illness or injury. The revealed
preference (RP) data that are typically available concern the tradeoff between risk levels
and wages. Since more dangerous jobs are paid a wage premium, the choice between
risk level and salary provides an indication of how much participants are willing to pay
for risk reductions. Mrozek and Taylor (2002) complete a meta-analysis of studies that
look at job choices of labor market participants. Groups other than working-aged males
may not be represented well by these measures, which may be problematic because the
amount people are willing to pay for prospective risk reductions may vary considerably
by gender, age, and labor market status. For example, stay-at-home mothers of young
21Evans and Smith (2006), however, find an ambiguous relationship between VSL and age. Other
researchers have tended to find that VSL and age have an inverted V-shape relationship.
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children may be especially under-represented since they are out of the labor market.
Stated preference (SP) data may be the only viable type of information concerning
willingness to pay for groups which are not in the labor market.
Cameron and DeShazo (2008) use stated preference methods to elicit
preferences for programs to reduce the risk of morbidity and mortality in a general
population sample of adults in the United States. The survey was developed carefully
using 36 detailed in-person cognitive interviews, three pretests and a large pilot study.
Knowledge Networks, Inc. administered the survey to 2,439 of their panelists and
achieved a respectable 79% response rate.22 In brief, the survey consists of five
modules. The first module asks respondents to rate their subjective risks, from low to
high, of contracting each of a range of major illnesses or injuries. Individuals are also
asked to think about how lifestyle changes would change their risks of these illnesses
and how difficult it might be to implement these lifestyle changes.
The second module is a tutorial that explains the concept of an "illness profile."
This is a description of a sequence of future health states associated with a major illness
or injury that the respondent may face over his or her remaining lifetime (described as
one of five specific types of cancer, heart attack, heart disease, stroke, respiratory
illness, diabetes, traffic accident, or Alzheimer' s disease). An illness profile includes
the years before the individual becomes sick (i.e. the latency period), illness-years while
the individual is sick, recovered/remission years after the individual more-or-Iess
22For more information on the survey instrument and the data, see Cameron and DeShazo (2008). For
more detail on the survey, please see an annotated sample at:
http://www.uoregon.edu/-cameron/vsl/Annotated_survey_DeShazo_Cameron.pdf .
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recovers from the illness, and lost life-years if the individual dies earlier than he would
have in the absence of the illness or injury. After the tutorial about illness profiles, the
individual is informed that he might be able to purchase new programs that would
reduce his risks of experiencing certain illness profiles. Each illness-related risk-
reduction program described in the survey consists of a diagnostic blood test plus
possible drug therapies and/or life-style changes, available at a specified overall cost
that is not covered by insurance.
The third, and key, module of each survey involves a set of five different three-
alternative conjoint choice experiments where the individual is asked to choose one of
two possible health-risk reducing programs or a status quo alternative. Each program
reduces the individual's risk of experiencing a specific illness profile. The illness
profile is described in terms of its baseline probability, age at onset, duration, severity
of symptoms and type of treatment, and eventual outcome (recovery or death). Each
corresponding risk reduction program is defined in terms of the extent to which it can
be expected to reduce this risk, as well as its monthly and annual cost. Figure I
provides one randomized example of the type of a stated choice scenario posed to
respondents.
Module 4 contains debriefing questions to cross-check the consistency of
responses. Module 5 is collected separately from our survey and contains detailed
socio-demographic data for the individual and the household, as well as responses to a
battery of health-related questions (including any illnesses the individual has already
faced).
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Extensive robustness and validity checks of the individuals' responses have been
conducted to evaluate common problems in SP analyses. These include risk
comprehension verification where individuals are asked to rank the sizes of risk
reductions, checks on the complexity of the choice sets where individuals are asked to
rate the difficulty of the choice sets, and a "cheap talk" reminder so that individuals are
careful to consider their budget constraints and not overstate their willingness to pay.23
Order effects for the choice sets are considered and individuals are instructed to assume
each choice set is independent of the other choice sets. Choices are readily
demonstrated to be sensitive to the changes in the scope and central attributes, such as
the cost of the program and the size of the risk reduction. Systematic sample selection
effects are controlled for, with methods explained in detail in Cameron and DeShazo
(2008).
Table 7 contains descriptive statistics for the variables used in the empirical
models presented in this chapter. It summarizes only the subset of variables from the
survey which are pertinent to the present analysis. These include attributes of the
different illness profiles presented to respondents (latency, present discounted sick-
years, recovered/post-illness years, and lost life-years). This information, combined
with data on the numbers and ages of children currently in the family, allows us to
23 A number of individuals and/or choice sets were dropped from the analysis according to minimal
exclusion criteria. The exclusion criterion for risk rejection was the respondent needed to be able to rank
successfully the sizes of the risk reductions associated with two risk mitigation programs. There were
4,887 alternatives (1,629 choices) that were excluded due to the risk comprehension criterion. The
exclusion criterion for scenario rejection was that the respondent chose the "neither program" alternative
and, in the follow-up question, chose only the answer "I did not believe the programs would work". There
were 6,708 alternatives (2,236 choices) excluded due to scenario rejection. There were also 996
alternatives (332 choices) excluded due to an error in the randomized design.
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determine whether the onset of the adverse health state will occur when there are likely
to be children still under the age of eighteen present in the respondent's household. The
variable list also includes attributes of the proposed risk reduction programs which are
described as reducing the individual's chance of suffering from these adverse health
states (including the cost of the program and the size of the risk reduction). Finally,
there are a number of relevant characteristics of the respondent (age, gender, income,
and whether there are two income-earners in the household).
3. A Random Utility Choice Model
The specification used to test the hypotheses outlined in the introduction builds
upon the utility-theoretic model presented by Cameron and DeShazo (2008). The base
model for his chapter uses the 13-parameter model from Cameron and DeShazo (2008)
and the effects of "scenario adjustment" the includes Bendiff/ and l(Nevel/) as
described in Chapter II. We then focus on the consequences of introducing additional
interaction terms that involve gender, the numbers of children in four distinct age
groups, single- versus dual-income households, and whether children are likely still to
be present in the household at the onset of each illness or injury as described in each
illness profile.
4. Empirical Estimation
There is little theory to guide the functional form of exactly how household
structure should enter into the empirical model. We considered five conditionallogit
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random utility models (RUMs) that were quadratic in discounted net income and
employed translog-like transformations of terms in the numbers of sick-years, recovered
(post-illness) years and lost life-years which make up each illness profile.24 We
considered heterogeneity with respect to household structure and found a parsimonious
specification which appears to be warranted by the stated choices of these respondents.
Our preferred specification is shown in Table 5, which displays all of the parameters in
the model.
In Table 6, we summarize just the key results with respect to household structure
for our preferred parsimonious model. Note that Table 6 describes just a single model.
We have merely arranged the parameter estimates strategically to highlight the baseline
coefficients (i.e. those which apply for males with no children) in column (1). The
statistically significant coefficients on our interaction terms, reflecting systematic
heterogeneity in preferences, are arrayed in columns (2) through (10) so that they line
up with the baseline coefficients which they shift. Recall that the age of the respondent
is extensively controlled for in the baseline specification (entering as it does,
quadratically, as a shifter of three of the coefficients in the model). Without these
respondent-age controls, there would be a much greater chance that the ages of children
in the household also proxy for the age of the respondent.
The following discussion focuses on two classes of utility parameters, which are
the two main ingredients used in the calculation of WTP for health-risk reductions: (a)
24 Our models are estimated using a conventional conditionallogit specification. In recent years, random
parameter specifications have become increasingly popular. Explorations of random parameters models
in simpler versions of models using these data have not yielded dramatically different results in terms of
the expected values of the key parameters, so we continue to use the conditionallogit specification.
58
the marginal utility of income, and (b) the marginal disutility from discounted future
time in adverse health states. The WTP is constructed as the ratio of the estimated
coefficients of these two classes of utility parameters. The presence of children of
different ages in the household, as well as the other variables considered in this study,
affect parameter estimates in both these classes of utility parameters and thus the
estimated WTP for a particular respondent facing a specified illness profile?5
4.1 Family Structure and Differences in the Marginal Utility ofIncome
The first two rows of Table 6 reveal how the different dimensions of family
structure-gender, the current presence of children, the structure of household income,
and the likely presence of children at the onset of the prospective illness or injury-can
affect the adult's marginal utility of net income. Net income measures the individual's
consumption of all other goods and services aside from the risk-reduction programs in
the stated preference choice scenarios. The marginal utility of income thus reflects
marginal utility from other types of expenditures. The remaining rows in Table 6 show
how the marginal utility of health state terms are affected by family structure and will
be discussed in Section 4.2.
Our parsimonious fitted model in Table 6 offers support for the hypotheses
made in the introduction. Row (1), column (2) shows a coefficient of 6.68 on the
indicator variable for female which more than doubles the baseline coefficient of 4.7.
25 In Dupont (2004), gender and parenthood indicators (and their interactions) enter directly into an
atheoretic WTP function. Her model does not distinguish between marginal utilities of income and
marginal utilities (or disutilities) from variations in environmental quality. Thus, only the net effects of
these two influences can be discerned.
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This suggests that the marginal utility of income is higher for women at all levels of
income. These coefficients support Hypothesis 2, that if a woman earns a lower income
than her partner, or if for any other reason she has a higher marginal utility of income,
she may be willing to pay less for health-risk reductions.
Columns (3) through (9) in Table 6 show the influence of the numbers of
children in different age groups on the marginal utility of income. The coefficient of
about -2.3 on the interaction of the female indicator variable and the number of children
ages 6-12, which is about half of the baseline coefficient, suggests that a mother's
marginal utility of income is lower when children reach this age-which tends to
coincide with the time when many mothers traditionally return to the labor market, and
thus may experience an increase in their own incomes. As college costs and other
expenses start looming in the presence of children age 13-1 7, we find that both males
and females tend to exhibit higher marginal utilities of income, with a coefficient of
about 2.2, which is an almost 50 percent increase over the baseline coefficient. Having
teenagers, and a higher marginal utility of income, will tend to reduce both parents'
demands for programs to reduce risks to their own health. Parents appear to be more
willing to pay to reduce their own health risks when their children are younger.26
In column 8 of Table 6, we see that the presence of two incomes in the
household, captured by the indicator variable l(dualinc) , produces a statistically
significant effect on the marginal utility of income, but only for women. In the majority
26 According to a report from the USDA's Center for Nutrition Policy and Promotion and data from the
BLS Consumer Expenditures Data, families, on average, spend more money on teenagers (aged 12-17)
than on younger children. See http://www.cnpp.usda.govlPublications/CRC/crc2007.pdf.
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of cases, the "second income" is likely to be the woman's own income. The coefficient
of -2.1 provides support for Hypothesis 3, that a woman who has her own income
(controlling for overall family income), may be more inclined to spend money on
health-risk reductions for herself. 27
The quadratic income term in row 2 represents the degree of financial risk
aversion. A negative coefficient on the quadratic form in net income implies that the
marginal utility of income declines as income increases. Men with no children appear to
have roughly constant marginal utilities of income. The negative coefficient on the
female indicator variable for the quadratic income term suggests that women are more
risk-averse with respect to income changes than men (i.e. they exhibit diminishing
marginal utilities of income, on average). Note, as shown in column (3) that both
genders appear to be risk averse with respect to income when there are infants between
the ages of 0 and 1 present in the household, as seen in the -.78 coefficient on the
quadratic income term.
A higher marginal utility of income for women will tend to reduce the implied
WTP for microrisk reductions, since this marginal utility enters via the denominator of
the WTP formula. However, since the marginal utility of income declines more quickly
for women as their incomes are higher, women's demands for health-risk reduction
programs will increase more quickly as a function of income.
27 The Knowledge Networks Inc. panelist profile data contains detailed information on employment status
(in nine discrete categories). In future work, we may consider systematic variation in demand for health
risk reductions as a function not only of the number of workers in a household, but also the respondents'
own employment status.
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4.2 Family Structure and the Marginal Utility ofAvoided Health Risks
The third through seventh rows of Table 6 reveal the sources of statistically
significant heterogeneity in estimated (dis)utilities of discounted future time in different
health states. Again, column 1 of Table 6 shows the baseline coefficient values (for
males with no children). Column 2 shows that females with no children have positive
coefficients that offset the baseline value. This shows that females derive substantially
less disutility from the prospect of a discounted future sick-year than do males. The
baseline coefficient is about -72, but this disutility is offset for females by a coefficient
of about 28. Males also have somewhat more disutility from the prospect of a
discounted lost life-year. The coefficient for males with no children is about -717 and
the slight offset for females is about 25.
Columns 3 through 9, again, reveal the nature of heterogeneity due to the family
structure and the numbers of children in different age groups. Column 4 reveals that
males, in the presence of pre-school children (aged 2-5 years), seem to have a much
lower disutility from sick-time than do childless males as shown by the positive
coefficient of about 103, which more than offsets the baseline coefficient of about -71.
Column 5 shows that women with children ages 2-5 have a substantially greater
disutility for sick-time than childless males and certainly more than males with
preschoolers. Perhaps children of this age are recognized to be exceptionally dependent
upon their mother's care-giving, so mothers view their own healthy time as an essential
input into their pre-school children's health.
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While the presence of pre-school children may decrease fathers' disutility from
sick-time, the presence of children in this age group appears to increase the disutility
from present discounted lost life-years for both parents. The baseline coefficient, for
males again, is -717 and the coefficient differential for each child aged 2-5 is about -41.
These coefficients offer some support for Hypothesis 1, that a parent's marginal utility
from healthy time is higher in the presence of children. The only coefficient that does
not support this is the decrease in a father's disutility from sick time. Perhaps the
reasoning for this is that being merely sick has the compensating benefit of an
opportunity to be home with the family while the prospect of death does not have this
compensating benefit.
One of the more provocative empirical results in this chapter is the finding that,
in the presence of additional teenagers (i.e. children between the ages of 13 and 17),
both males and females perceive lesser disutility from present discounted lost life-years.
The baseline coefficient is, again, about -717 and the coefficient differential for each
teenager is about 23. This may imply that parents view their own healthy time as a
progressively less essential input into the child's wellbeing as the child gets older.
However, a cynic might conclude that living with more teenagers makes the prospect of
being dead start to look better and better. This lesser disutility of lost life-years,
combined with the higher marginal utility of income with each teenager, produces a
significant drop in parental willingness to pay for their own health-risk reductions
during their children's teen years.
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In column (9), we show the significant effects of the indicator variable,
l(dkidonset(). This indicator captures any systematic effect caused by an illness
profile for which the onset of the illness occurs when at least one child is still under 18
years of age. This is true for 3% of the 15,040 illness profiles used in the choices
analyzed in this study (i.e. for about 430 profiles). The perceived disutility from sick-
time is dramatically greater, for both genders, if the illness profile in question features
an onset time when there will likely still be dependent children in the household as seen
by the coefficient -114, which is greater than the baseline coefficient of -70. If a parent
gets sick, the ailing parent may be less able to care for the child and any children in the
household may have to bear part of the burden of caring for the sick parent.
The indicator l(dkidonset() is a statistically significant shifter ofthe
coefficients on each of the three variables involving interactions between discounted
sick-years and discounted lost life-years. The coefficient of 482 on the interaction
between sick years and lost-life years is dramatically larger than the baseline coefficient
of 57. This suggests that the disutility of each discounted lost life-year is greatly
lessened if it is preceded by an additional discounted sick-year. The interactions with
age, however, suggest that this offsetting effect declines and then rises with the age of
h d h · f .. 28t e respon ent at t e time 0 questIOnIng.
28 The minimum occurs at about age 44 if a child is present at the onset of the disease. If none of the
current children will be under 18 at the onset of the illness, the minimum WTP occurs at about 51 years of
age.
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5. Results for Simulated Distributions of Microrisk Reductions
The demand for health-risk reductions depends upon both the marginal utility of
income and the disutility from the sick-time and lost life-years associated with the
health risk in question. This demand can be summarized by the WFP for a microrisk
reduction, which is a more-general analog of the value of a statistical life. Recall that
VSLs tend to be viewed as one-size-fits-all measures of demand for mortality risk
reductions, where the form of mortality is usually conceived as "sudden death now."
Our measures incorporate both mortality and morbidity, as well as varying latencies and
different durations of time in different adverse future health states.
Fitted WFP varies systematically with the individual's income and age, as well
as with the exact nature of the illness profile under consideration. In Table 7, we display
the results of some illustrative simulations of the distributions of WFP values implied
by our fitted model. The top rows are for married individuals who are now 30 years of
age, with differing numbers of pre-school children. The bottom rows are results for
unmarried individuals of the same age. Table 8 displays the results for 4S-year-olds
with varying numbers of teenagers. For each age group, we calculate the simulated
distribution of WFP for a microrisk reduction in two very simple illness profiles: (1)
sudden death this year and (2) nine years in the future, the individual is sick for one year
followed by death. Profile 1 is the closest our model can come to a VSL-type estimate if
it were multiplied by 1 million, although our WFP estimates still depend fundamentally
on age and income.
65
In the simulations for 30-year-olds, we consider persons in households with zero
children, with one child between two and five years of age, and with two children
between two and five years of age. For illness Profile 2, sick for one year and then
death with a nine-year latency, we assume that there will be at least one child present at
the time of onset, so the 1(dkidonset!) variable will be set equal to 1 in these
simulations.
In the simulations for 45-year-olds, in illness Profile 1 (risk of death this year),
the youngest child currently in the thirteen- to seventeen-year-old interval will still be at
home and the 1(dkidonset!) variable will be set equal to 1 in these simulations. For
illness Profile 2 (with a nine year latency), the youngest child currently in the thirteen-
to seventeen-year-old interval will be at least 22 years old at the time of onset, and thus
relatively independent. The variable 1(dkidonset!) is thus set equal to zero for all of
these simulations.
In Tables 7 and 8, we show the medians as well as the 5th and 95th percentiles of
the simulated distributions of WTP based on 1,000 random draws from the joint
distribution of the maximum likelihood estimates of model parameters. For 30-year-old
males with zero, one, or two children aged 2-5 years, willingness to pay for a microrisk
reduction in the chance of sudden death is about $7.90, $10.40, and $13.00. For 45-
year-old males with zero, one, or two children aged 13-17 years, WTP for a rnicrorisk
reduction in sudden death is about $8.70, $5.30, and $3.40.
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5.1 Gender
Our WTP simulations suggest that women reveal a much lower willingness to
pay for risk reductions than men under both illness profiles and for both age groups.
This provides support for Hypothesis 2, that women may be less willing to pay to
reduce health risks for themselves. The estimated differences in WTP between men and
women control for household income levels, so this finding is not merely an artifact of
the lower average incomes of women. Since both the numerator and denominator of the
WTP are smaller, these two effects tend to offset one another in the overall WTP
estimate.
5.2 Presence of Children
For 30-year-olds, the presence of each additional child aged two to five
increases the WTP by about 25-35 percent for both males and females, which shows
support for Hypothesis 1, that there is an increase in parents' marginal utility of healthy
time in the presence of children. A 30-year-old female, having zero, one, or two
children (ages 2-5), and facing an illness profile of sudden death this year is associated
with a WTP for a microrisk reduction equal to $3.10, $4.20 and $5.30. That is a 36%
increase for the first child and an additional 26% increase for the second child. Profile
2, sick for one year and then death after a latency period of 9 years, shows a similar
increase in WTP with additional children. Both illness profiles for 30-year-olds exhibit
a similar pattern in general which may be due to the fact that at least one child will be
under the age of 18 when the illness strikes.
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In contrast, for 45-year-olds, the WTP declines about 25-40 percent for each
additional child age thirteen to seventeen years old. For example, being a 45-year-old
female, having zero, one, or two children (ages 13-17), and facing sudden death this
year is associated with a WTP of $3.40, $2.5 and $1.90. This decline is likely due to the
fact that the presence of the teenagers seems to both increase the adults' marginal utility
of income, and decrease their disutility from discounted lost life-years. We speculate
that the growing need to provide for college expenses and the other costs associated
with older children outweighs the adults' concerns about investing in their own future
health. Furthermore, the growing independence of children this age means that the
parent's own health is a less essential input into the child's well-being.
5.3 Presence ofa Second Income
We simulate the WTP for women with and without two incomes in the
household, while controlling for overall household income. We do this to evaluate
Hypothesis 3, that women who have independent incomes will be more inclined and
more able to invest in reducing their own health risks. For a 30-year-old woman with
two children between the ages of two and five, a second income increases the WTP by
$1.00, or by about 19 percent. For an illness profile of sick for one year and then death
with a nine year latency, the WTP increases by $0.60-a 19 percent increase in the
WTP. For a 45-year-old woman with two teenagers who is facing sudden death now,
the WTP increases by 9 percent. These WTP estimates lend support to Hypothesis 3 that
women's demands for health-risk reductions are sensitive to the proportion of
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household income represented by their own earnings. For a 45-year-old woman with
two teenagers who is facing illness and death in nine years, however, the WTP is much
smaller, both with or without a second income. This may be partially due to the fact that
a teenager will no longer be under the age of 18 when the illness strikes in ten years.
5.4 Differences Across Illness Profiles
For 30-year-olds, the WTP associated with the risk of death this year (Profile 1)
versus a risk of illness and death in nine years (Profile 2) declines between about 26 and
45 percent depending upon the number of children present and the gender of the adult.
For example, the decline for a female with no children is from $3.10 to $2.20, while the
decline for a mother of two children (ages 2-5) is from $5.30 to $3.20.
These WTP differences across illness profiles are even larger for 45-year-olds.
The WTP associated with the risk of death this year (Profile 1) versus a risk of illness
and death in nine years (Profile 2) declines between about 47 and 65 percent depending
upon the number of children present and the gender of the adult. For example, the
decline for a childless female is from $3.40 to $1.70 (about 50 percent), while the
decline for a mother of two teenagers is from $1.90 to approximately $0.70 (a decline of
about 65 percent). These changes illuminate the differences in willingness to pay for
health-risk reductions for sudden death this year versus illness and death with a latency
period. The results also show differences in WTP for parents and non-parents across
different illness profiles and how WTP varies in the presence of children of different
ages.
69
6. Conclusion
As a result of the utility-theoretic basis for our model, there are two distinct
opportunities for the effects of gender and parenthood variables to affect adult demands
for health-risk reductions. On the one hand, the number of children in different age
groups affects the adult's marginal utility of income (which reflects competing demands
on the household's budget that may edge out expenditures on the adult's own health-
. risk reduction efforts). On the other hand, there is also evidence that the number of
children in different age categories affects the adult's expected disutility from
prospective sick-time and prospective lost life-years---especially when the illness
profile in question will affect the adult while there are still likely to be children under
the age of eighteen in the household.
We find the presence of children has significant effects on a parent's marginal
utility of income even more broadly. Parents of infants are, on average, more risk-
averse with respect to net income. Controlling for household income, women tend to
have higher marginal utilities of income (perhaps because of their longer life
expectancies). However, a mother's marginal utility of income is significantly lower in
the presence of grade-school children-coinciding with the time that mothers
traditionally return to the labor market, and thus experience an increase in their own
incomes. When children reach their teenage years and the prospect of college starts to
loom, we find that parents' marginal utilities of income are higher.
The marginal disutilities of adverse health states appear to differ systematically
by family structure as well. We show that for each additional pre-school child, mothers
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exhibit an increased marginal disutility of a sick-year-perhaps because they view their
own healthy time as an essential input into their children's well-being at this age.
However, for each additional pre-school child, fathers appear to exhibit an increased
disutility of a lost life-year-perhaps because their continued income-earning power is
viewed as essential to the child's future wellbeing (even though fathers are typically
less involved in many child-rearing tasks than are mothers when children are very
young). In contrast, in the presence of each additional teenager, both mothers and
fathers reveal a decrease in their disutility of a lost life-year. This may be because
parents, as their children grow older and more self-sufficient, view their own healthy
time as a less essential input into the child's wellbeing. At the same time, with each
additional teenager, the marginal utility of parents' income is greater (e.g. because
income at this stage can be put to many other good uses, such as college expenses to
enhance the child's human capital).
There appears to be some evidence that parents are much more concerned about
preserving their future health if they will still have children at home, but their sense of
urgency about their own health protection may decrease for illnesses or injuries that will
not affect them until after their children are grown. Concern about the prospect of
children still at home is most clearly expressed through differences in the
substitutability between sick-years and lost life-years. This perceived substitutability
differs with the age of the respondent (it tends to be quadratic in age, with a minimum
during middle age), but it is much more pronounced if children are likely to be present
at the onset of the illness.
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Willingness to pay combines two components, the marginal disutility of adverse
health states and the marginal utility of income, and varies systematically by household
structure. For parents, we find that willingness to pay to avoid health risks varies
systematically with the age of the parent as well as the numbers of children in each age
group presently in the household. Simulations based on our estimated model reveal
that, for younger adults, the presence of each additional preschool child increases the
WFP by about 25-35 percent for both males and females. In contrast, for middle-aged
adults, the WFP declines about 25-40 percent for each additional teenager in the
household. Although fathers are willing to invest more in absolute terms to reduce their
own health risks than are mothers, mothers exhibit a much higher percentage increase in
WFP for health-risk reductions with the presence of children. We speculate that,
controlling for income, the family may view the mother's health as a more essential
input into the production of healthy children than a father's health, on average.
Finally, also controlling for overall household income, we find that women in
households with two income-earners invest much more in their own health-risk
reductions than do women in households with only one income-earner. Presumably,
women with their own incomes find themselves both more inclined, and more able, to
direct household resources towards their own health protection.
A few caveats need to be highlighted. The empirical results in this chapter
reflect the assumption that individuals use a 5% discount rate. The issue of discounting
is the subject of ongoing research, since, for the basic model in Cameron and DeShazo
(2008), WFP estimates vary somewhat with the assumed rate of discount. Knowledge
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Networks, Inc. report only the numbers of children in the respondent's household in
each of four age categories. They do not report the genders of children in the survey
and do not ask whether the adults who participated in the survey are actually the parents
of these children. We refer in the chapter to "mothers" and "fathers," but we cannot be
certain that these blood relationships exist. Finally, the illustrative examples
concentrate upon illness profiles that involve sudden death now or sickness for a year at
a point nine years in the future followed by death. Of course, the fitted model is general
enough to admit for a wide variety of illness profiles, including non-fatal major illnesses
and cases where long periods of morbidity may precede mortality.
Despite some limitations, we have described ways that willingness to pay for
health-risk reductions appears to vary as household structure evolves over time.
Willingness to pay for microrisk reductions is a more-general alternative to the VSL
estimate. The WTP is more versatile and allows the willingness to pay estimates to vary
fundamentally with income and age, as well as with attributes of the risk in question or
the characteristics of the individual who is being asked to value the risk reduction.
The three main hypotheses tested in this research stem from theoretical models
by Jacobson (2000), Bolin et al. (2001), Bolin et al. (2002a) and Bolin et al. (2002b),
and we find that these three hypotheses are broadly supported by our empirical results.
We find evidence that the presence of children affects the parents' marginal utilities of
income and health, that women may be willing to pay less to reduce their own risks, and
that women who have their own independent incomes may be willing to spend more on
their own health risk reductions.
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This research also complements other investigations concerning the willingness
to pay by parents or society to reduce health risks faced by children. To the extent that
the presence of children alters adults' willingness to pay for health-risk reductions for
themselves, these changes in demand may reflect both parental altruistic motivation
towards their children (i.e. parental concern for the value that their children place on
their parents' health) and may also reflect the influence of competing demands on the
household budget represented by the addition of financial responsibility for the care of
children of different ages.
In the next chapter, we continue to look at aspects of heterogeneity in WFP
estimates. We discuss how WFP varies by the type of disease in questions.
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CHAPTER IV
WILLINGNESS TO PAY AND TYPE OF DISEASE
A version of this chapter is co-authored with Trudy Ann Cameron and 1.R. DeShazo
1. Introduction
Government agencies such as the Environmental Protection Agency typically
use a measure called the Value of a Statistical Life (VSL) to monetize the benefits for
human health risk reductions from a particular policy. The VSL is an ex ante measure
of individual willingness to pay (WTP) to achieve a tiny risk change, where this WTP
has been scaled proportionately to a risk change of 1.0. Although it is tempting to
interpret a VSL as society's willingness to pay to save one particular human life with
certainty, this would be inappropriate. VSL estimates come from analyzing very small
risk changes and are intended for policy use in contexts where similarly small risk
changes are considered. Different environmental policies lead to different risk
reductions, such as a reduction in the risk of lung cancer or heart disease. However, for
all of these health threats, the same average VSL is commonly employed. This
constrains the willingness to pay (WTP) for any given-sized risk reduction to be
identical for all kinds of diseases and health threats. The contribution of this chapter is
to demonstrate that WTP for health risk reductions varies systematically by disease
type. This suggests the U.S. EPA and other government agencies should consider using
different WTP values that are more closely tailored to particular diseases. This step
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could more accurately represent the WTP of the particular population affected by a
given policy.
In this chapter, we examine how individual willingness to pay (WTP) for health
risk reductions varies systematically across different types of major health problems,
including five types of cancers (breast cancer, prostate cancer, colon cancer, lung
cancer, and skin cancer), chronic heart disease (as well as sudden heart attacks),
respiratory disease, strokes, diabetes, Alzheimer's disease and traffic accidents. There
are eleven different health threats in total, including one gender-specific cancer that is
designated as breast cancer if the respondent is female, and prostate cancer if the
respondent is male. In the conjoint choice study fielded by Cameron and DeShazo
(2008), respondents are shown five sets of choice scenarios each involving three
alternatives: two different risk-reduction programs and the status quo. For each
respondent, ten of the eleven possible health threats for their gender were used (two in
each of the five choice sets).
There are many reasons why people may be willing to pay different amounts to
avoid different types of illness or injury. For example, there may be a "cancer
premium" as noted in Savage (1993). Van Houtven et al. (2008) find strong evidence
of a "cancer premium" and find that preferences differ with the length of the latency
period. WTP by disease may also vary with the respondent's personal beliefs
concerning their individual subjective risk of contracting a disease, their current health-
related behaviors, and even with the extent to which they may feel that they have room
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to improve their health-related behaviors in order to reduce the risks of different
diseases.
Slovic (1987) explains that health risks may differ in terms of the degree of
dread associated with them or with the perceived controllability of the risk. Tolley et al.
(1994) finds that people, given a choice between saving 100 people from cancer, heart
disease or motor vehicle accidents, found that most people choose to prevent deaths
from cancer. Alberini et al. (2004) find that individuals who already have a disease
appear not to have a lower overall WFP than others who have not had the disease.
Savage (1993) finds that WTP differs across four specific causes of death: stomach
cancer, plane crash, automobile crash and a home fire. In a random sample survey of
approximately 800 people in Chicago, he finds that WFP is related to the perceived
dread and the respondent's degree of familiarity with each cause of death. Respondents
are first asked about their perception of their risk exposure for each cause of death.
Then they are asked to allocate 100 dollars to reduce the risk of each of the four causes
of death. Savage finds that WFP is positively related to the perceived risk of exposure
and the extent to which they dread that particular cause of death and WFP is negatively
related to the amount respondents know about a particular cause. He also finds that the
WFP to reduce the risk of stomach cancer is more than double the WFP for other
causes, which he attributes to the lack of familiarity with stomach cancer and the dread
associated with it. Savage (1991) also finds similar responses in an earlier study about
dreaded deaths due to nuclear power plant accidents.
77
Sunstein (1997) investigates people's assessments of WTP to avoid "bad
deaths"-deaths that seem unusually horrible. There are many reasons that the cause of
death may be perceived as "bad." For example, the cause of a particular type of death
may seem less controllable, may affect certain demographic groups more than others, or
may cause unusually long and severe amounts of suffering. In a study of 116
University of Chicago law students, Sunstein found that about 40% of respondents felt
that an avoided death from cancer was worth more than an avoided death from a heart
attack. Although respondents may harbor more dread concerning some diseases than
others, Sunstein concludes that the major policy considerations should be the number of
lives saved, the numbers of life-years saved, the quality of life during those saved years,
and the cost-effectiveness of the programs. (I.e. he does not advocate than making
policy simply based on the amount dread associated with a disease.)
Hammitt and Liu (2004) study systematic differences in WTP based on a latency
period and the amount of dread associated with the disease. They find WTP estimates
may vary greatly between WTP to avoid a fatal accident and WTP to avoid a disease
that comes after a latency period or one that involves a large amount of dread. Since
most illnesses and deaths due to environmental pollution come after a latency period,
the work of Hammitt and Liu (2004) suggests an average VSL estimate that comes from
a source such as a wage-risk study of sudden, job-related accidents, for example, may
not be ideal for valuing the benefits due to environmental policies.
In this chapter, we contribute the literature by looking at systematic differences
in WTP for measures to reduce an individual's risk of suffering from different specific
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diseases. The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the choice
data and empirical specification. Section 3 discusses the empirical results and Section 4
concludes.
2. Choice Data and Empirical Specification
The stated preference dataset from Cameron and DeShazo (2008) provides
sufficient information to permit an analysis of differences in WTP by type of disease.
These data are explained in Chapter II and the descriptive statistics most pertinent to
this chapter are shown in Table 8. The third module of the survey-where respondents
choose between two different health risk reduction programs and the status quo-is the
module of key importance in this chapter.
The empirical model used in this chapter is a generalization of the basic model,
previously described in Chapter II of this dissertation. In this chapter, we generalize the
basic 13-parameter utility-theoretic estimating specification for the three-alternative
choice model to allow for systematic heterogeneity, by disease type, in the basic
coefficients. Theory offers little guidance on how heterogeneity in preferences as a
function of respondent characteristics and attitudes toward risk should enter into the
systematically varying versions of the 13-parameter model (via interaction terms). Thus
we allow data to dictate where the systematic differences appear to be present.
We explore a variety of alternate specifications when we add heterogeneity
according to disease type. Initially we allow only the marginal utility of the log of
discounted sick-years to vary by the type of disease, on the presumption that the nature
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of the illness should affect the disutility of sick-years more than the disutility of lost
life-years. Next, we introduce a new set of indicator variables associated with each
program alternative (to capture the disease label attached to each stylized illness profile
for which the respondent's risk is to be reduced). These indicators allow for a discrete
"lump" of disutility to be associated with each disease label, independent of the illness
profile specified in the choice scenario. Next we allow for heterogeneity in both places,
simultaneously. Finally, we introduce systematic variation by disease in the disutility
associated with lost life-years. This final model is potentially very large, and not all
dimensions of heterogeneity have a statistically significant effect on every preference
parameter. Thus we report, as our preferred model, a parsimonious specification with
the persistently insignificant coefficients on the new interaction terms set to zero.
In the specifications we consider, note that we also allow for additional
heterogeneity in parameters in each of these classes of respondent characteristics where
we feel that failure to do so might contribute to omitted variables bias in our key
coefficients of interest. In the following subsections, we discuss the rationale for each
of these additional types of controls.
2.1 Confulence
"Confidence" is the respondent's answer, near the end of the survey, to the
question "Imagine you experience one of the major illnesses described in this survey.
How confident are you that your diagnosis and treatment by your current health care
provider would be both timely and of high quality?" Possible responses include -1=
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"not at all confident," 0= "somewhat confident," and "+1=highly confident."
Intuitively, if a respondent does not have a high level of confidence that she would get
timely and high quality treatment from her health care provider if she were to
experience one of these diseases, she may be more willing to pay for a program to
reduce the risk of getting the disease. Note that it might be preferable to represent this
variable as a pair of indicator variables, but we utilize it as an approximately continuous
variable due to the need to reduce the large number of parameters in the model.
2.2 Vulnerability
We allow the estimated marginal utilities associated with each of the health state
terms to vary with "vulnerability." This is the respondent's answer to the question
"What is the chance that you will experience, either for the first time or as a recurrence,
one of the major illnesses discussed within the next 20 years?" The response options
are coded as -2="very unlikely," -l="somewhat unlikely," O="somewhat likely," and
1= "very likely." Intuitively, if a respondent feels they have a higher chance of
experiencing one of these diseases in the next 20 years, they may have a higher WTP for
health risk reduction programs. Again, we will normalize our estimates of fitted WTP
on the "0" answer.
An additional normalization control is introduced via an interaction between the
vulnerability variable described above and the respondent's age. We expect that older
respondents are more likely to believe that they will face one of these diseases in the
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next twenty years, so if "vulnerability" were used alone in the model as a control, it
might pick up this additional age effect.
2.3 Controllability
We also allow for heterogeneity with respect to how easy the individual
perceives it is to control the type of disease in question. "Controllability" is the
respondent's answer to the question "How much do you think that improving your
lifestyle or habits would reduce your risk of [each class of health risk]." Response
options ranged from -2= "very little," to +2= "a lot." Again, the variable is treated as
approximately continuous to limit the number of parameters, and we normalize on the
zero value in calculating predicted estimates of WTP. A priori, the sign of the
coefficient on this variable is actually uncertain. If respondents feel that a disease is
more controllable, they might make program choices that suggest a higher WTP if this
subjective controllability implies that they think the program being offered in the choice
scenario is more likely to work. On the other hand, if they feel the disease is more
controllable, perhaps their choices will imply a lower WTP if they feel they are able to
control the disease on their own, without the intervention of the additional program
offered in the choice scenario. We are only able to assess the net effect of these two
countervailing possibilities.
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2.4 Subjective Risk
We expect that individuals who feel more at risk for getting a particular disease
would have a higher WTP for a risk reduction program for that disease, so the disutility
associated with time in each adverse health state should be negative. "At risk" is the
answer to the survey question "Think about your health, your family history, and
hazards to which you are exposed. Which illnesses or injuries do you feel most at risk
of experiencing over your lifetime?" Response options ranged from -2= "low risk," to
+2= "high risk." We expect willingness to pay will be higher for a program that
addresses the health threat that the respondent feels most likely to experience.
2.5 Smoker
We also control for whether individuals reveal that there is room for them to
reduce their health risks by improving their lifestyle or habits if they quit smoking. We
use this acknowledgement to differentiate between smokers and non-smokers. Then we
allow for an interaction between current smoker and two of the health threats,
respiratory disease and lung cancer. If the respondent could improve their health if they
smoked less, which means they currently smoke, they may feel more vulnerable to
experiencing respiratory disease and lung cancer. The descriptive statistics for all of
these control variables are displayed in Table 9.
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3. Empirical Results
Table 10 displays our first basic generalization by type of health risk which
introduces an interaction term between sick years and the type of health threat.
Intuitively, this means that the particular type of illness or injury may affect the amount
of disutility associated with being sick. We use heart disease as the base case and all
other marginal utilities are relative to the utility from reducing the risk of heart disease.
The first column in Table 10 displays Modell which includes the coefficients from the
basic 13-parameter model and introduces coefficients on the interactions of the sick-
year term with the disease labels. What is most important is not whether these
coefficients are significantly different from zero, but whether they are significantly
different from each other.29 Model 2 in Table 10 is a richer variation that estimates the
disease label effects while controlling for heterogeneity in confidence, vulnerability,
controllability, subjective risk, and whether the respondent is a smoker.
The next specification, in Table 11, has an indicator variable for each disease
rather than allowing the coefficients on the sick-year terms to vary. In the real world,
the health threat labels would have particular symptoms associated with them, so the
attributes would be correlated with the labels. In Stated Preference research, we can
randomly assign the labels to various illness profiles, as long as the label and the illness
profile appear reasonable and credible to respondents (we did not allow for a recovery
from Alzheimer's disease, for example). In this survey, it would be possible to see
identical illness profiles associated with different illness labels. The advantage of
29 Using a likelihood ratio test of the joint hypotheses, we tested pairs of coefficients and found that the
parameters are significantly different from each other.
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having the label and the illness profile randomized as much as possible is that it would
be possible to estimate WTP for any major disease based on a particular illness profile.
As Table 11 shows, we find that the labels on the health threats have a certain
meaning to respondents and thus have a lump of (dis)utility associated with them. A
higher number, such as on diabetes, will increase the value on WTP for health risk
reductions. Again we are concerned whether the parameters are significantly different
from each other and we find that the parameters are significantly different from each
other. The remaining columns in the table show additional interactions with sick-years
and the disease labels, which allows for additional heterogeneity in the parameters.
Our empirical results suggest that the marginal (dis)utility from many diseases is
very similar to the disutility associated with heart disease. We find that breast cancer
has a lower marginal utility relative to heart disease and that colon cancer, skin cancer,
respiratory disease and Alzheimer's disease have a relatively higher marginal utility
relative to heart disease.
Table 12 incorporates heterogeneity in disease labels as well as in disease labels
interacted with sick years. In this model, the estimates suggest that the greatest
heterogeneity by illness type is in the constant terms. There is a lump sum of utility
associated with the health threat label, rather than a difference in the utility of a sick
year.
Table 13 is the most complete model and allows for heterogeneity by health
threat in the constant term, the sick year term, and the lost-life year term. Again, most of
the difference by health threat is seen in the difference in the constant term. There does
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appear to be less disutility associated with sick years due to heart attacks, respiratory
disease, and diabetes as compared to the disutility from heart disease. There appears to
be more disutility from lost-life years due to breast cancer than due to heart disease.
All specifications considered have linear and quadratic marginal utility of net
income terms. The linear term is expected to be positive and the quadratic term is
expected to be negative to account for the diminishing marginal utility of income. We
assume these are constant with the type of health threat considered in the illness profile.
The income terms enter into the denominator of the WTP for health risk reductions. We
assume that the marginal utility of net income is not influenced by the specific health
threat considered. We interacted health threat with the income terms, but we did not
find consistent evidence that the income terms vary by type of health threat. In the
simple 5-parameter model, there is some evidence that the linear marginal utility of net
income for respiratory disease may be lower than the other health threats, but this effect
disappears in the 13-parameter model and there is significance on diabetes instead.
Since there is not a consistent pattern to the significance, we have assumed the marginal
utility of net income terms to be the same across all health threats.
The remaining marginal utilities displayed in the tables are for health state terms
and enter in the numerator of the WTP for health risk reductions. These terms are
allowed to vary by type of health threat.
The full model leads to a large number of coefficients, so the final specification
is the parsimonious model that retains only the most statistically significant coefficients.
Reducing the number of coefficients will reduce the effect of multicollinearity. The
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parsimonious model is displayed in Table 14. We find, again, that most of the utility is
a lump sum due to the illness label and not mainly due to utility differences in avoided
sick years associated with a particular disease. We use this parsimonious model when
simulating WFP values.
Table 15 shows the simulated WFP for 30-year-olds, 45-year-olds, and 60-year-
olds. All three age groups have the WFP estimates for avoiding two different illness
profiles. The first illness profile is sudden death now due to each of the health threats
and the WFP estimates for avoiding this illness profile are shown in the third column.
A WFP for an illness profile of sudden death now that is scaled for a risk change of 1.0
is the most similar to the conventional VSL. The second illness profile has a ten-year
latency period before suffering from a particular health threat, then sick for 5 years, and
then death. Including a latency period may be more accurately representing the
scenario of avoidance of risk through increased environmental protection. The WFP
estimates for avoiding this illness profile are shown in the fourth column of all three
tables. Additionally, all of the attitudinal variables are zeroed out to get an estimate for
the median respondent and a benchmark individual with an income of $42,000 is used.
For cancer risks, WFP is highest to avoid breast and prostate cancer. For non-
cancer risks, WFP is highest to avoid heart disease and heart attacks. WTP to avoid a
stroke is slightly lower varying from $6.4 for 30-year-olds down to $5.4 for 60-year-
olds.
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Most estimates are higher for avoiding sudden death now than for avoiding an
illness profile with latency. The WFP to avoid sudden death now due to lung cancer
and respiratory disease is much higher for smokers than for non-smokers, as expected.3o
The WFP to avoid these health threats with a ten year latency period appears to
decline with age. The 30-year-olds have the highest WFP values and the 60-year-olds
have the lowest. The only exception is WFP to avoid Alzheimer's disease may increase
slightly with age.
The WFP to reduce the risk of skin cancer is very low. We suspect that people
find skin cancer to be the least bad option of these major diseases. Although some
respondents chose the program to reduce the risk of skin cancer, fewer respondents
chose these programs than the programs for the other health risks.3!
WTP to avoid traffic accidents is very low. This may be due to the nature of the
survey question since it is difficult to get the scenario for traffic accidents to conform to
the other scenarios that pertain to diseases. Respondents were told that they could buy
equipment for a new car or retrofit an older car. Many of the illness profiles happened
more than seven years into the future and it is possible that respondents figured that
they would have already purchased a new car by that time and, therefore, the safety
devices considered in the illness profile would not help protect them. Also, people tend
30 We also interact smokers with all health threats and smokers tend to have a lower WTP than non-
smokers for health threats other than respiratory disease and lung cancer.
31 There were 389 observations or-choices of a program to reduce the risk of skin cancer. The next lowest
number of observations for a choice was 486 for a program to reduce Alzheimer's disease. The largest
number of observations was to avoid heart attacks and heart disease at 760.
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to perceive that they are better than average drivers and are at relatively little risk of an
auto accident.
4. Conclusion
Using a stated preference survey on willingness to pay for health risk reductions,
we look at systematic differences by disease. We use a random utility model
framework for this analysis and then allow the parameters to shift with disease labels in
our empirical analysis. We find systematic differences due the disease labels and, to a
lesser extent, in the marginal utilities of health states.
Reductions in the risk of breast and prostate cancers, especially in the near term,
seem to be valued even somewhat above the VSL currently employed by the U.S. EPA.
Values for colon cancer reductions are somewhat lower, but the range of WTP values
includes the roughly $6-7 million VSL used by the EPA (if scaled for the 1.0 risk
reduction). Reductions in lung cancer risks are of much lesser concern-exceptto
smokers, where the WTP is on the order of $11 in the near term and even higher if some
latency is involved. Non-smokers care relatively little about reducing lung cancer risks,
and no respondents seem to be concerned about reducing skin cancer risks.
Willingness to pay to reduce risks from heart disease and heart attacks are very
similar to each other (and to breast cancer and prostate cancer) suggesting WTP of $7 to
$8, while strokes may be of somewhat lesser concern, perhaps similar to colon cancer
(at least when some latency is involved) and in line with current EPA numbers.
Smokers appear to be as much concerned about reducing their risk of respiratory
disease as men are about reducing prostate cancer risks if the risk involves some latency
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(but somewhat less so in the case of sudden death in the current period). The WTP is $4
- $8. Non-smokers, however, have very little interest in paying to reduce their risks of
respiratory disease.
Diabetes is more of a concern among the young than among older people,
whereas the reverse is true for Alzheimer's disease. Traffic accidents are of
surprisingly little concern among older people, perhaps because they see themselves to
be less at risk because they spend less time on the road, or because they believe
themselves to be safer drivers. Reports of traffic accidents for respondents themselves,
or among their family and friends, seem to decline with age.
Concerning environmental threats to health, one might think first of respiratory
disease and lung cancer from "criteria" pollutants and toxic air pollutants. Some portion
of the population may also be aware of the role of air pollution in heart disease. Our
results suggest that there may be a huge difference between the smoking and non-
smoking populations in demands for health risk reductions via reductions in air
pollution.
These differences in WTP estimates for different types of health threats suggest
that models which constrain the estimated marginal utility parameters for different
health states to be the same across all illnesses may be too restrictive. This restriction
may cause the loss of information that may be very valuable from a policy perspective.
The differences in WTP estimates suggest that respondents have different WTP values
for avoiding different diseases. This suggests that the types of health threats targeted by
a specific policy might be taken into consideration in benefit-cost analyses.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
In this dissertation I explore heterogeneity in the WTP for health risk reductions.
I first discuss a methodological improvement to stated preference research involving
"scenario adjustment." Scenario adjustment occurs when respondents modify some
aspect of a given scenario based upon their personal beliefs. For example, due to a
family history of heart disease, a particular respondent might think a scenario that
reduces heart disease for the average person in fifteen years is likely to affect them
much earlier-say in only five years. This means the respondent answers a slightly
different question than the researcher intended and give a WTP that does not exactly
reflect the stated question. Through the use of debriefing questions, I find evidence of
scenario adjustment in this choice experiment on health risk reductions. I also offer a
possible counterfactual correction for scenario adjustment.
Next I examine empirical patterns in WTP by household structure. I find,
through WTP simulations, that the presence of each additional preschool child increases
the WTP for both males and females. I also find that, for middle-aged adults, the WTP
declines for each additional teenager in the household. While controlling for overall
household income, I find that women in households with two income-earners invest
more in their own health-risk reductions than do women in households with only one
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income-earner. Thus, household structure appears to affect WTP for health risk
reductions.
Lastly, in Chapter Four, I discuss empirical evidence of systematic differences
in WTP by type of health threat. Among cancers, I find that respondents have a higher
WTP for breast and prostate cancers and a slightly lower WTP for colon cancer. I find
that smokers have a dramatically higher WTP to avoid lung cancer and respiratory
disease than non-smokers. Younger people have higher demands for risk reductions in
diabetes than older people while older people have demands for risk reductions in
Alzheimer's disease than younger people. Again, age and type of disease appear to
influence WTP estimates.
Finally, I discuss the potential impact this research may have on benefit-cost
analysis. I use a simplified example to show how the priority ranking of policies can
differ when using WTP for health risk reductions that varies by individual and health
threat characteristics discussed in this dissertation rather than the standard VSL estimate.
In my example, I choose to use a simplified version of regulations rather than discuss all
of the complexity and the many assumptions made in the actual benefit-cost analyses. I
focus only on the benefits-side since dissertation concerns benefits estimation, but costs
are also an extremely important part of the analysis. For simplicity, however, I will
assume the costs of the policy are $10,000 for each policy and that costs are the same
for all four of the policies.
I discuss five different policies that are all simplifications of actual regulations
that have undergone benefit-cost analyses. Policy A is a regulation that will improve air
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quality through a reduction of particulate matter and thereby reduce the risk of heart
disease. Policy B regulates the use of disinfectants that can enter ground water and the
drinking water system which can increase the risk of colon cancer. Policy C is a
regulation that increases the stability of motor vehicles and decreases the likelihood of a
fatal traffic accident. Policy D reduces exposure to hexavalent chromium which has
been shown to increase the risk of lung cancer. Again, for simplicity, suppose each of
the policies leads to a ten percent risk reduction in that specified health threat for a
population of 100,000 people.
If the standard VSL estimate of $6.1 million (in 2003 dollars) is used, then the
net benefits to society are $51,000. This number is calculated by first scaling the $6.1
million for the VSL down to a one in one million risk reduction to get $6.10. Then
multiply 6.10 by the risk reduction of 10 percent per individual multiplied by the
population of 100,000. Then the costs of the policy, $10,000, are subtracted to get the
final net benefit estimate of $51,000. This is the estimate for all of the four policies due
to my simplifying assumptions that allow me to focus on the benefits estimation. Since
all the policies have the same estimate of net benefits, there is no priority ranking for
the four policies in this simplified example.
If we use the WTP for a microrisk reduction where we consider the type of
disease, however, we find different results. The estimated net benefits to society from
Policy A, which reduces the risk of heart disease, are $73,700 (WTP =$8.37 multiplied
by the ten percent risk multiplied by 100,000 in the population minus the costs of the
policy of $10,000). Using the same methodology, but different WTP estimates as
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discussed in Chapter Four, the estimated societal benefits from Policy B, which reduces
the risk of colon cancer are $34,800. The estimated societal net benefits from Policy C,
which reduces the risk of traffic accidents, are $-2,200. For Policy D, which reduces the
risk of lung cancer, we need to make another assumption about the number of smokers
in the population. On average, smokers appear to have a dramatically higher WFP to
reduce the risk of lung cancer than non-smokers. The smoking rate has recently
declined to less than 20% ofthe adult population (Benincasa (2009)). Therefore, in
order to calculate an estimate the societal benefits, I assume that 20% of the population
smokes and 80% does not. The estimated societal net benefits from Policy Dare
$19,860.
Given the different estimates of the net benefits to society, these policies can
now be prioritized according to their net benefits to society. A comparison of the net
benefits of these policies shows that, in this very simple example, society will rank
Policy A with the highest priority followed by B, D and finally C. Thus, using WTP
estimates that differ by type of disease (or by characteristics of individuals such as
scenario adjustment and family structure) may provide policy-makers with a different
priority ranking of regulations.
Given more assumptions and knowledge about the affected populations, this
example could be expanded to reflect the findings in Chapters II and III as well. This
quickly becomes extremely complicated, however, and does not offer the clear and
concise demonstration of the importance of this research. Given this and other research,
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however, the more specific information that is available will allow more accurate
estimates of the benefits to society from particular policies.
These systematic differences in WFP are important for use in benefit-cost
analyses for comparison of environmental regulations. Accurate estimates of the
benefits of a potential policy will indicate whether society thinks the benefits are truly
greater than the costs. This way, policy-makers can have a better idea of which
environmental, health and safety regulations are highest priority for society.
Just as inverse demands for different individuals vary for goods and services in
the market, we should also expect the inverse demands for risk reductions to differ.
Using a standard VSL assumes that all individuals have the same inverse demands for
these risk reductions and then societal benefits from a policy are estimated by
multiplying the VSL by the expected risk reductions. In this dissertation, I discuss
several dimensions along which these inverse demands vary by the individual and the
health threat in question. WFP estimates that take into account the characteristics of the
affected population as well as the type of health threat targeted by the policy will lead to
more accurate estimates of the societal benefits from a particular policy.
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APPENDIX A
FIGURES AND TABLES
Figure 1: One Example of a Randomized Choice Scenario
Choose the program that reduces the illness that you most want to
avoid. But think carefully about whether the costs are too high for
you. If both programs are too expensive, then choose Neither
Program.
If you choose "neither program", remember that you could die early
from a number of causes, including the ones described below.
Program A Program B
for Heart Disease for Colon Cancer
Symptoms/
Treatment
Recovery/
Life expectancy
Risk Reduction
Costs to you
Your choice
Get sick when 71 years old
2 weeks of hospitalization
No surgery
Moderate pain for remaining life
Chronic heart condition
Die at 79
5%
From 40 in 1,000 to 38 in 1,000
$15 per month
[ = $180 per year]
C Reduce my
chance of heart
disease
C Neither
Program
Get sick when 68 years old
1 month of hospitalization
Major surgery
Severe pain for 18 months
Moderate Pain for 2 years
Recover at 71
Die of something else at 73
50%
From 4 in 1,000 to 2 in 1,000
$4 per month
[ = $48 per year]
C Reduce my
chance of
colon cancer
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Figure 2: Example of a Debriefing Question Used to Correct for Scenario
Adjustment
You may have chosen Program A, Program B, or neither. Regardless of
your choice, we would like to know when, over your lifetime, you think you
would first need and benefit from the two programs (if at all).
Your answers below may depend upon the illness or injury in question, as
well as your current age, health and family history.
Around when do you think you would begin to value highly the risk
reduction benefits of each program?
Select one answer from each column in the grid
Program A
to reduce my chance of
diabetes
Program B
to reduce my chance of
heart attack
For me, benefits would start
Immediately C C
1-5 years from now C C
6-1 0 years from now C C
11-20 years from now C C
21-30 years from now C C
31 or more years from now C C
Never (Program would not C c~benefit me)
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Figure 3: Examples of Benefits Differ Calculations
Different stated latencies, but respondent chooses "11-20 years" in the debriefing
question
A. No "overestimate of latency" (BenDiff/ =0)
1-5 years
Selected interval
Stated latency
...
11-20 years
Zerooverestiirnate of the
latency
B. "Overestimate of latency" is positive (BenDiff/ > 0)
Selected interval
C. "Overestimate of latency" is negative (BenDiff/ < 0)
11-20 years
Minirnurn underestirnate of the
latency
31+ years
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Scenario Adjustment
(n =15040 illness profIles and associated risk reduction programs)
Mean Std.dev. Min. Max.
Program attributes
Monthly program cost ($) 29.9 28.7 2 140
Ml{ =Risk change achieved by program -.00341 .00167 -.006 -.001
Stated Illness profiles
Latency (in years, stated in scenario) 19.6 12.0 1 60
- l(nevel/) ("Program will never benefit
.0769
me")
Bendiff/ (minimum overest. of latency) -7.47 12.0 -59 29
Sick years (undiscounted) 6.50 7.17 0 52
pdvi/ =Present value of sick-years 2.21 2.51 0 16.3
Recovered years (undiscounted) 26.1 13.0 0 64
pdvr/ =Present value of recovered years .477 1.37 0 15.9
Lost life-years (undiscounted) 10.8 10.3 0 55
pdvl/ =Present value of lost life-years 2.57 2.93 0 17.8
Attributes of individuals
Annual income (in $10,000) 5.09 3.41 0.5 15.0
Age at time of choice 50.4 15.1 25 93
Systematic selection from RDD contacts
t:
P(sel;) - P =Difference between fitted
response/non-response and population .677 3.36 -.316 17.9
average
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Table 2: Scenario Adjustment Model (Parsimonious; alternatives = 22560)
I
Modell Model 2
Uncorrected Corrected
xl(neve1/) xBendiff/(Parameter) Variable I Coefficients Coefficients(130 XlOS) [first income term] 5.183 8.071 0.225I (8.30)*** (10.69)*** (5.14)***
I
(131 xl 09 ) [ second income termJ I -.1992 -.2109 .7656
I (4.22)*** (4.15)*** (3.05)***(alO )m:s log (pdV(A +1)
I
-47.89 -57.32 212.7 7.083
(5.35)*** (5.04)*** (3.91)*** (7.24)***
(a13 ) [P(sel) - pJ ~I1:s [log (pdvi;A +1~ 3.372 3.853(2.34)** (2.45)**
(a20 )~I1:s log (pdV';A +1)
,
-16.49 -57.93I
I (1.76)* (5.77)***
(a30 )~I1:s log (pdvl;A +1) I -580.1 -858.3 4.092
! (3.25)*** (4.28)*** (3.26)***
(a31 )age;o .~I1:s log (pdvl;A +1) I 20.46 43.15
I (2.82)*** (5.41 )***(a32 )age;20 .~I1:s log (pdvl;A +1) ! -0.1874 -0.3719 0.0064I (2.70)*** (4.97)*** (7.39)***
(a40 )~I11s [log (pdvl;A +1)r 1 199.3 281.8 395.6
I
(2.41)** (3.11)*** (4.51)***
(a41 )age;o ·~I11s [log (pdvl;A +1)r -7.786 -15.71 -5.197(2.32)** (4.31)*** (3.69)***
(a42 )agei~ .~I1tS [log (pdvl;A + 1)r 0.0739 0.1365 -0.0013(2.27)** (3.90)*** (3.12)***
(aso )m1S [log (pdvi;A +l)J 102.4 129.6 -348.0 -4.301(1.40) (1.62) (3.77)*** (3.90)***
{log (pdv1t +l)J
(as!) age;o .~I1tS [log (pdvi;A +1)J -4.484 -6.680(1.57) (2.16)**
.[ log (pdvl;A +1)J
(aS2 )age~ .m:s [log (pdvi;A +1)J 0.0561 0.0624 0.0752(2.10)** (2.17)** (3.28)***
{log (pdvl;A +1)J
LogL -11694.646 -10954.934
a Corrected utility parameters are purged of scenario adjustment as captured by systematic differences in
these parameters for alternatives where stated latency was not accepted by the respondent.
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Table 3: Simulated WTP for a Microrisk Reduction with Scenario Adjustment
Without and with correction for illness scenario adjustment in 2003 $US with
Income =$42,000 (mean [5t\ 95th percentiles]a)
Sudden death
Sudden death
Sudden death
5 yrs sick, recover
1 year sick, then
die
5 yrs sick, then die
5 yrs sick, recover
1 year sick, then
die
Age Illness profile I Uncorrected Corrected I Uncorrected Corrected
30 1 year sick, recover I $ 2.49 $ 3.20 i $ 1.54 $ 1.94I [1.3,3.94] [2.43,4.07] I [0.77,2.49] [1.43,2.50]
5 yrs sick, recover I 3.75 3.94 I 2.32 2.35
'[2.59,5.16] [3.13,4.86] I [1.60,3.20] [1.87,2.90]
! I
I I1 year sick, then I 4.14 6.52 I 4.42 1.67
die I [1.67,6.80] [4.89,8.40]! [3.26,5.97] [0.97,2.42]
5 yrs sick, then die I 4.19 7.02 I 4.57 1.99I [1.39,7.21] [5.05,9.12] I [3.51,6.00] [1.42,2.65]
I 4.26 5.74 I 4.35 1.42
I [1.30,7.38] [3.96,7.64] I [2.97,6.04] [0.55,2.28]
45 1 year sick, recover ! 2.33 2.68 I 1.33 1.27
[1.20,3.75] [1.93,3.48] [0.64,2.15] [0.82,1.72]
3.56 3.47 2.08 1.68
[2.45,4.92] [2.73,4.33] [1.44,2.84] [1.29,2.12]
4.59 7.61 2.53 -0.93 c
[2.99,6.55] [6.39,9.09] [1.95,3.21] [-1.59,-0.37]
4.44 8.48 I 2.66 -0.39 c
[2.73,6.66] [7.04,10.14] i [2.16,3.32] [-0.89,0.04]
i
4.57 6.10 I 2.43 -1.37 c
I [2.88,6.58] [4.88,7.39] I [1.71,3.19] [-2.15,-0.70]
I I
60 1 year sick, recover I 2.21 2.04 I 1.11 0.30
I [1.07,3.46] [1.31,2.75] I [0.55,1.67] [-0.08,0.63]
!
3.26 2.86 i 1.66 0.59
[2.19,4.5] [2.19,3.62] I [1.22,2.11] [0.27,0.87]
I
2.40 6.41! 1.27 -2.76 c
I[0.98,4.03] [5.26,7.82] I [0.57,1.91] [-3.79,-1.97]
5 yrs sick, then die 0.92 b 6.93 I 1.23 -1.85 c
i [-0.6,2.58] [5.65,8.48] I [0.67,1.78] [-2.63,-1.27]
I 3.46 4.97 I 1.39 -3.20 c
I I
1 [1.88,5.13] [3.83,6.18] I [0.52,2.09] [-4.32,-2.33]
a Based on random draws from the joint distribution of the estimated parameters.
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for Household Structure
(7520 choice sets; 22560 alternatives; 15040 illness profiles; 1801 individuals)
Description Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Illness Profiles
Time until onset (years) 19.58 12.02 1 60
Present discounted sick-years 2.21 2.51 0 16.3
Present discounted recovered-years 0.474 1.36 0 15.9
Present discounted lost life-years 2.57 2.93 0 17.8
=1 if current child <18 at illness onset .02859
Risk-Reduction Programs
Monthly cost $29.87 28.71 2 140
Risk change -.00341 .00167 -0.006 -0.001
Respondent Characteristics
Income 2002 $ US $50,771 33,966 5,000 150,000
Age in years at time of survey 50.30 15.21 25 93
=1 if female, = 0 if male 0.513
=1 if married, = 0 if unmarried 0.688
# children aged 0-1 yrs in hhld .0161 .1352 0 2
# children aged 2-5 yrs in hhld .1254 .3880 0 3
# children aged 6-12 yrs in hhld .2143 .5737 0 5
# children aged 13-17 yrs in hhld .1575 .4563 0 3
=1 if two incomes in household .6356
Illness Profile/Respondent Interactions
=1 if the individual states that "the 0.385 .4865program will never benefit me"
The individual's overestimate of the
-5.95 11.08 -59 29latency
Table 5: Parsimonious Household Structure Model
(n = 1801 individuals, 7520 choices, 22560 alternatives)
Full Model
Linear net income term
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(1300 xl 05 ) [linear net income term]
... * l(female)
... * l(female) * # kids 6-12 yrs
... * # kids 13-17 yrs
... * l(female) * l(dual-income)
Quadratic net income term
(1310 xl 09 ) [ quadratic net income term]
... * l(female)
... * # kids 0-1 yrs
Sick-years terms
(a'lO )t1II:s log (pdvi;A +1)
...* l(female)
... * # kids 2-5 yrs
...* l(female) * # kids 2-5 yrs
...* l(child at onset)
Recovered-years terms
4.663
(6.21)***
6.241
(5.28)***
-2.266
(2.02)**
2.143
(2.31)**
-0.165
(1.59)
o
-.2835
(3.89)***
-.762
(2.41)**
-70.71
(5.22)***
28.4
(2.17)**
103.8
(3.80)***
-68.52
(2.11)**
-116
(3.07)***
-58.54
(5.78)***
Table 5, Continued
Lost life-years terms
(a30 )MI~S log (pdvl: + 1)
...* l(female)
...* l(married)
... * # kids 2-5 yrs
... * # kids 13-17 yrs
(a31 )ageio • L1rr~s log (pdvl: +1)
(a32 )age:o . L1rr~s log (pdvl: + 1)
Lost life-years squared terms
(a40 )m~S [log (pdvl: +1)T
(a41 ) ageiQ ·m~s [log (pdvl: +1)T
(a42 )age:o .m~s [log (pdvZ: +1)T
Sick-years, Lost life-years interaction terms
(aso )L1rr~s [log (pdvi: +1)] .[log (pdV(A +1)]
...* 1(child at onset)
(aS1 ) ageio • L1rr~s [log (pdvi iA+ 1)J. [log (pdvliA+1)]
... * 1(child at onset)
(aS2 ) age:o . L1rr~s [log (pdviiA+1)J. [log (pdvl: + 1)]
...* 1(child at onset)
-600.2
(3.28)***
22.75
(2.02)**
-34.54
(3.09)***
-33.66
(1.98)**
26.22
(2.24)**
33.66
(4.67)***
-0.285
(4.23)***
212.4
(2.35)***
-13.12
(3.63)***
0.113
(3.28)***
-44.59
(4.18)***
555.5
(2.39)**
o
-22.4
(2.17)**
o
.2457
(2.20)**
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Table 5, Continued
Nuisance parameters
- shift if respondent believes "will never benefit"
(~O xl09)[second income term] * l(nevel/)
(alO )AIl:s log (pdvi;A +1) *l(nevel/)
(a40 )m:s [log (pdvlt +l)T *l(neve1/)
(a41 ) ageiQ ·m:s [log (pdvl;A +1)T*l(nevel/)
(aso )m:s [log (pdvi/ +1)J. [log (pdvl jA+I)J*l(neve1ij)
(as2)age;~AIl:s[log (pdvi/ +l)}[log(pdvl/ +l)J *1(neve1ij)
- shift with minimum overestimate of latency
(Poo X lOS) [first income term] *bendiff; j
( a lO )AIl:s log (pdvi;A +1) *bendiffi j
( a 30 )AIl:s log (pdvl;A +1) *bendiffi j
(a32 )age;2o.AIl:s log (pdV(A +1) *bendiff/
(a42)age;~·m:s [log (pdvi;A +l)T *bendiff/
(aso )AIl:s [log (pdvi;A + I)J. [log (pdvi;A +1)J*bendiff; j
- shift with difference from mean participation probability
(aI3 )[P(se() - pJ AIl:s [log (pdvi;A +1)J
0.743
(2.97)***
206.8
(3.82)***
413.9
(4.69)***
-5.567
(3.93)***
-355.4
(3.84)***
0.08
(3.52)***
0.233
(5.28)***
7.507
(7.55)***
4.266
(3.62)***
0.0063
(7.11)***
-0.0012
(2.98)***
-4.484
(4.03)***
3.784
(2.37)**
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Observations 22560
Log L -10901.417
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 6: Discernible Heterogeneity with Respect to Household Structure3
(n =1801 individuals, 7520 choices, 22560 alternatives)
Shifters for gender and household structure
L-----LD----_--l Q2 CD {~1 (?_2 (2L .
! Baseline: ! *1(female.) *1(female.)! male, no I *1(female) *nkids01i *nkids25i * k'd 25' * k'd 612'
! kids ! n lSi n lSi
----------------------------------------~---------._-+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Marginal utility ofnet income:! i
! 4.66 i 6.24 0 0 0 -2.27(Poo x 105 )[linear income tenn] : (6.21)b ! (5.28) (2.02)
i 0 i -.284 -.762 0 0 0(PlO x109 )[quadraticincometenn]! ! (3.89) (2.41) __ _ _ _
-------------------------------------------~--------------~------------------------------------------------- -------------- - -------
Marginal utility ofhealth states:
28.4 0 104. -68.5 0
(2.17) (3.80) (2.11)
22.8 0 -33.7 0 0
(2.02) (1.98)
0 0 0 0 0
(alO )~rr{S log (pdvij + I)
(a JO )~rr{S log (pdvlj + I)
(aso )~rrfS [log (pdvi! + I)J
{log( pdvl! + I}J
(aSl ) age;o .~rr{S [log (pdvij + I)J
.[log (pdvl! +1}J
(a S2 ) agei~ .!1rr{S [log (pdvi( + I)J
.[log(pdvlj +1}J
-70.7
(5.22)
-600.
(3.28)
-44.6
(4.18)
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
.......
o
VI
Table 6, Continued
o
*1(married)
(,Boo X lOs )[linear income term1
i (1) i Cont... (7) (8) (9) (10)f---------------\---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------I Baseline: I * . *1 (child *l(femaleJ
1 male, no I ••• nkzds1317 i )! k'd ! at onset *l(dualinc)----------------------------------------------L-----!--~----j--------------------------------------------------- ~ _
Marginal utility ofnet income: i
4.66 i... 2.14 0 -1.65
b ! c(6.21) i... (2.31) (1.59)
o i ... 0 0 0 0y~~ ~~ ~~)_[_~~~~:~t~~_i~~~~~_~~~l________ J _
Marginal utility ofhealth states:
(alO )AIl/s log (pdvi( + I)
(a30 )MI(S log (pdvl/ +1)
(aso )AIl(S [log (pdvi( + I)J
-[Iog(pdvl( +l)J
(aSl ) ageio .AIltS[log (pdvi( +I)J
-[log (pdvl/ +l)J
(aS2 ) age;o .MI{S [log (pdvi/ + 1)J
-[log (pdvl/ + I)J
-70.7
(5.22)
-600.
(3.28)
-44.6
(4.18)
o
o
o
26.2
(2.24)
o
o
o
-116
(3.07)
o
556.
(2.39)
-22.4
(2.17)
.246
(2.20)
o
o
o
o
o
o
-34.5
(3.09)
o
o
o
LogL -10901.417
--o
0\
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Table 7: Simulated WTP for a Microrisk Reduction-Household Structure
For specified individuals of age 30 with and without children and household
income of $42,000 (2003 $US)
(median, 5th and 95th percentiles)
13.16 5.42
(8.46, 19.14) (3.55, 7.60)
I
Illness Profile #1 I
Sudden death
Ithis year
! Male Female Ii
Illness Profile #2 II
In 9 years, sick 1 year
then death I
Age = 30
Married
Married
Children now
ochildren
1 child 2-5 yrs
2 children 2-5
yrs
i $8.81I (6.01, 12.37)
!
!
i 11.01
i (7.52, 15.42)
!
!
:
$3.59 I
(2.46,4.89) I
i
4.50
(3.22,6.13)
Male
$6.88
(5.01,
9.37)
6.08
(3.96,
8.63)
6.88
(3.77,
10.52)
IFemale I
i$2.69 I
I(1.98,3.62) I
I
\
!
2.64 !
(1.82, 3.69) !
!
I
3.28 I
(2.01,4.71) i
!
2 children 2-5 I 6.26 3.80 I
yrs, dual-income I - (4.09,8.85) ! - (2.32,5.47) j
---.------------------- ------------------------------J--------------------------- -----------------------J------------------------ -------------------------1
Unmarried 0 children I 5.05 I
1 6.56 2.62 (3 25 1.89 1
I (3.88,9.62) (1.55,3.83) 7.00)' (1.21,2.69) I
I !
1 child 2-5 yrs ! i
I 8.74 3.55 i (~.~~ 1.87 I
I (5.53, 12.65) (2.22,5.05) I 6.52)' (0.98,2.74) I
! ,
2 children 2-5 I j
yes I(6.3~~·i~.37) (2.5~~~.58) i:~, (L1~,5~83) I
2 children 2-5 I 5.14 2.85 j
______________________._ !~~~__~~~~~~_~~~_:~ L ~ ~=_~~=_~_~_~~~~__L ~__________ __~~_~=_~:_~:~_?!.__I
Respondents were given no opportunity to express negative willingness to pay. Negative values for
rnicrorisk reductions (produced for some draws from the asymptotically joint normal distribution of the
maximum likelihood parameters) can be interpreted as zero.
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Table 8: Simulated WTP for a Microrisk Reduction-Household Structure
For specified individuals of age 45 with and without children and household income of
$42,000 (2003 $US)
(median, 5th and 95 th percentiles)
Age =45 ! Illness Profile #1 i
Sudden death
this ,ear
Illness Profile #2
In 9 years, sick 1 year then
death
!
Married Children now Male Female Male Female
Married ochildren $9.56 $3.96 $5.22 $2.07
(7.29, 13.03) (3.13,4.99) (4.02,7.04) (1.59,2.61) I
1 child 13-17 yrs 5.61 2.83 i 2.79 1.30(4.22,7.60) (2.15,3.64) ! (1.97,3.76) (0.87, 1.78)
2 children 13-17
yrs
3.57
(2.26,5.30)
2.01 I 1.50 0.77
(1.23, 2.89) I (0.48, 2.52) (0.11, 1.35) I
2 children 13-17 : 2.18 I 0.81 I
yrs,dual-income! - (1.28,3.11) I - (0.08,1.47) I
I I I
----------------~~----p- ---------------~----------------------T------------------------------ --------------------------1--.------------------------- ---------------------------1
Unmarried 0 children '7.33 3.04 I 3.44 1.29 I
I (5.31, 10.31) (2.23, 3.94) ! (2.33,4.86) (0.83, 1.80)
1 child 13-17 yrs
i
4.09 2.06
I
1.55 0.65
(2.80, 5.84) (1.37,2.79) (0.68, 2.46) (0.17,1.15)
2 children 13-17 I 2.42 1.34 I 0.55 0.22
yrs I (1.06, 3.95) (0.48,2.17) (-0.68, 1.54) (-0.58, 0.82)
2 children 13-17 ",il _ 1.42 0.20 ,,:1
yrs, dual-income (0.46,2.33) - (-0.65,0.87)
_________________________________________________________.l________________________ _ _
Respondents were given no opportunity to express negative willingness to pay. Negative values for
microrisk reductions (produced for some draws from the asymptotically joint normal distribution of the
maximum likelihood parameters) can be interpreted as zero.
Table 9: Descriptive Statistics for Type of Disease
Included in Controllability At RiskBy Illness Profile: a Illness Profile? -2 =very little -2 =low risk
+2 =a lot +2 high risk
Breast Cancer 0.0465 -0.2966 -0.0650
Prostate Cancer 0.0454 "
Lung Cancer 0.0912 " "
Colon Cancer 0.0896 " "
Skin Cancer 0.0906 " "
Heart Disease 0.0938 0.2443 0.0057
Heart Attack 0.0933 " "
Respiratory Disease 0.0891 -0.3881 -0.5481
Stroke 0.0943 -0.0520 -0.3576
Traffic Accident 0.0856 -1.1471 -0.3874
Diabetes 0.0902 -0.2488 -0.4349
Alzheimer's Disease 0.0906 -1.077 -0.9987
By Respondent: Mean (Std Dev)
Age b 50.296 (15.04)
(at time of survey)
Confidence b -.115 (.808)
(in health care)
Vulnerability b 0.159 (.667)
(in next 20 years)
Could smoke less C .963 (1.619)
a Sample Size is 13,696 illness profiles
b Sample Size is l63lrespondents
C Sample Size is 1607 respondents
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Table 10: Sick Year Shifters Only (Alternatives =20,544)
Sick Year Terms: Modell Model 2 *Confidence *Vulnerability *Age *Vulnerability *At Risk *Control
*Age
(alO )Ml!S log (pdvi/ +1) : -95.35 -191.7
(7.45)*** (3.84)***
* any cancer - - - - - -0.6119 -7.972
-0.12 (1.29)
* breast cancer -13.77 -137 -3.815 -89.64 4.236 1.085
-0.6 -1.47 -0.12 -0.93 (2.62)*** -0.61
* prostate cancer 1.983 123.3 21.88 -145.1 -0.504 2.492
-0.09 -1.37 -0.68 -1.64 -0.31 -1.45
* lung cancer 40.38 99.57 21.97 -34.34 0.9399 -0.3927
(2.56)** -1.61 -1.16 -0.59 -0.9 -0.34
* colon cancer 21.72 150.6 35.38 -65.12 -0.5888 0.647
-1.42 (2.49)** (2.01)** -1.15 -0.61 -0.6
* skin cancer 110.1 191.6 -13.1 20.3 0.6026 -0.9654
(6.56)*** (2.93)*** -0.65 -0.32 -0.55 -0.77
* heart disease : - - -21.51 -151.4 2.077 2.155 4.237 -.488
-1.26 (2.88)*** (2.24)** (2.12)** -0.7 (0.07)
* heart attack 14.22 : 129.8 10.82 -132.9 -0.3226 0.828
-0.66 -1.49 -0.36 -1.42 -0.2 -0.46
* respiratory disease 97.75 241.2 35.56 -78.59 -0.6714 0.09412 11.85 -.7585
(5.49)*** (3.30)*** -1.59 -0.99 -0.55 -0.06 (2.44)** (0.14)
* stroke 45.68 46.7 17.16 -188.4 1.747 1.756 5.56 -11.3
(2.12)** -0.5 -0.57 (1.76)* -1.06 -0.88 -0.87 (1.62)
* traffic accidents 107.9 99.05 -13.63 51.94 2.679 -2.395 5.291 -6.988
(4.80)*** -1.13 -0.42 -0.57 -1.6 -1.22 -0.98 (1.27)
* diabetes 67.22 61.45 -49.46 -101.1 2.345 0.5836 -8.056 -3.786
.....
.....
0
Table 10, continued
Sick Year Terms: Modell Model 2 *Confidence *Vulnerability *Age *Vulnerability
*Age *At Risk *Control
* Alzheimer's disease
(3.77)*** -0.88
76.14 312.1
(4.20)*** (3.99)***
(2.14)**
17.39
-0.76
-1.4
31.44
-0.39
(1.91)*
-2.241
(1.76)*
-0.43
-0.927
-0.65
(1.70)*
-1.943
-0.34
(0.70)
15.01
(2.40)**
Observations : 20544 : 20544
LogL : -10610.6 : -10537.1
Additional parameters are included in the model and retain the same signs and significance levels as they display in Table 13. These parameters are the linear
and quadratic income, recovered year, selection correction, interactions between age and interaction between sick years and lost life years, and higher order
lost-life year and interaction terms.
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
--
--.......
Table 11: Simple Disease Label Effects Only (Alternatives = 20,544)
Shifters (O=neutral, except for age) I
Disease Labels: Basic Terms *Confidence *Vulnerability *Age *Vulnerability *Smoke
*Age
breast cancer 1.463 -.08836 .5559 -.01756 -.003789
(4.72)*** (0.71) (1.53) (2.93)*** (0.53)
prostate cancer .6704 -.06969 .9738 -.002084 -.01167
(2.14)** (0.54) (2.65)*** (0.34) (1.58)
lung cancer .1108 -.1194 .3749 -.004723 .0004623 .2952
(0.43) (1.21) (1.31) (0.98) (0.08) (7.91)***
colon cancer .4528 -.007631 .4561 -.001773 -.002096
(1.94)* (0.08) (1.64) (0.40) (0.38)
skin cancer .04743 -.008459 .3777 -.006317 -.00153
(0.18) (0.08) (1.23) (1.26) (0.25)
heart disease - -.0451 1.059 .01016 -.01329
(0.49) (3.88)*** (7.36)*** (2.50)**
heart attack .9605 .1938 .8664 -.006974 -.005922
(4.00)*** (2.07)** (3.09)*** (1.49) (1.07)
respiratory disease -.04607 -.0806 .6294 -.004015 -.002302 .1804
(0.17) (0.78) (2.02)** (0.81) (0.37) (4.60)***
stroke .731 .03887 .9462 -.00574 -.007716
(3.09)*** (0.42) (3.43)*** (1.25) (1.42)
traffic accident .3349 .08645 .1857 -.01069 -.0004559
(1.23) (0.81) (0.61) (2.04)** (0.07)
......
......
N
Table 11, Continued
Disease Labels:
diabetes
Alzheimer's disease
Basic Terms
1.159
(4.65)***
-.0148
(0.06)
*Confidence
.2556
(2.58)***
-.0333
(0.34)
*Vulnerability
1.039
(3.45)***
.2189
(0.76)
*Age *Vulnerability *Smoke
*Age
-.0219 -.009477
(4.42)*** (1.57)
.0003553 .0006567
(0.08) (0.12)
Observations 20544
LogL -10370.799
Additional parameters are included in the model and retain the same signs and significance levels as they display in Table 13. These parameters are the linear and quadratic
income, recovered year, selection correction, interactions between age and interaction between sick years and lost life years, and higher order lost-life year and interaction
terms.
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
......
......
w
Table 12: Simple Disease Label Effects and Sick Year Shifters (Alternatives = 20,544)
Shifters (O=neutral, except for age)
Disease Labels: Basic Terms *Confidence * Vulnerability *Age * Vulnerability *Smoke *At Risk *Control
*Age
breast cancer 1.645 -.3666 .2653 -.01894 .003763
(3.31)*** (1.80)* (0.44) (1.94)* (0.30)
prostate cancer 1.201 -.05958 .8127 -.009229 -.004269
(2.47)** (0.29) (1.38) (0.96) (0.35)
lung cancer .4581 -.2087 .564 -.01338 -.004338 .298
(1.20) (1.35) (1.28) (1.80)* (0.48) (7.91)***
colon cancer .8928 .3423 .02574 -.01174 .006426
(2.54)** (2.30)** (0.06) (1.71)* (0.73)
skin cancer .2758 -.1693 .6447 -.01257 -.008539
(0.69) (0.98) (1.38) (1.58) (0.90)
heart disease - -.3143 1.056 .01409 -.01321
(2.17)** (2.49)** (7.07)*** (1.54)
heart attack 1.385 .2832 .8113 -.01311 -.005392
(4.90)*** (2.65)*** (2.49)** (2.36)** (0.84)
respiratory disease .7035 .01013 1.189 -.01815 -.01191 .1833
(1.81)* (0.06) (2.44)** (2.41)** (1.23) (4.63)***
Stroke .9261 .07068 .9136 -.007343 -.007812
(3.33)*** (0.66) (2.89)*** (1.35) (1.25)
......
......
+:-
Table 12, Continued
Disease Labels: Basic Terms *Confidence * Vulnerability *Age * Vulnerability *Smoke *At Risk *Control
*Age
traffic accident .5665 .06044 .3002 -.01432 -.005281
(1.73)* (0.48) (0.85) (2.27)** (0.75)
diabetes 2.159 .2876 1.783 -.04211 -.02311
(5.36)*** (1.67)* (3.40)*** (5.19)*** (2.12)**
Alzheimer's disease .7238 .05709 .5165 -.01478 -.004757
(1.93)* (0.36) (1.13) (2.00)** (0.52)
Sick Year Terms:
(alO )~I1:s log (pdvit + I)
-286.6
(5.57)***
* any cancer - - - - - - -1.176 -8.361
(0.23) (1.35)
* breast cancer 238.7 -87.15 -102 .8789 2.425
(1.69)* (1.71)* (0.64) (0.35) (0.80)
* prostate cancer 368.4 12.41 -51.18 -1.359 2.157
(2.73)*** (0.24) (0.36) (0.54) (0.75)
* lung cancer 273.8 -19.55 28.46 -.91 -.8605
(3.12)*** (0.64) (0.31) (0.58) (0.47)
* colon cancer 309.5 87.15 -125.8 -1.501 2.346
(3.67)*** (3.04)*** (1.38) (1.05) (1.32)
--
--VI
Table 12, Continued
Sick Year Terms: Basic Terms *Confidence * Vulnerability *Age * Vulnerability *Smoke *At Risk *Control
*Age
* skin cancer 251.5 -34.6 49.71 -.4511 -1.49
(2.77)*** (1.06) (0.53) (0.28) (0.78)
* heart disease - -72.6 -46.83 5.531 .5728 - 3.836 .2977
(2.63)*** (0.56) (5.47)*** (0.34) (0.63) (0.04)
* heart attack 361 64.32 -72 -1.117 .8381
(3.54)*** (1.84)* (0.68) (0.60) (0.40)
* respiratory disease 409 30.79 157.7 -2.884 -2.66 - 12.83 4.302
(3.91)*** (0.89) (1.26) (1.61) (1.18) (2.64)*** (0.78)
* stroke 212.5 21.86 -75.68 1.715 .781 - 4.883 -11.14
(1.96)* (0.62) (0.63) (0.90) (0.34) (0.77) (1.60)
* traffic accidents 214.7 -11.23 43.9 1.154 -2.661 - 3.557 -8.583
(2.10)** (0.30) (0.41) (0.59) (1.18) (0.66) (1.56)
* diabetes 457.9 10.34 194 -4.148 -3.517 - -7.253 -6.465
(4.42)*** (0.26) (1.59) (2.27)** (1.49) (1.52) (1.19)*
Alzheimer's disease 394.3 25.77 69.95 -2.912 -1.257 - -2.55 14.62
(3.46)*** (0.69) (0.54) (1.53) (0.54) (0.45) (2.33)**
Observations 20544
LogL -10296.213
Additional parameters are included in the model and retain the same signs and significance levels as they display in Table 13. These parameters are the linear and quadratic
income, recovered year, selection correction, interactions between age and interaction between sick years and lost life years, and higher order lost-life year and interaction terms.
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
>-'
>-'
0\
Table 13: Full Model (Simple Disease Label Effects, Sick Year and Lost Life-year Shifters, Alternatives = 20,544)
Shifters (O=neutral, except for age)
Basic Terms *Confidence *Vulnerability *Age *Vulnerability *Smoker *Control *At Risk
*Age
Disease Labels:
breast cancer 1.133 -.467 .3414 -.0102 .00266
(2.08)** (2.10)** (0.52) (0.96) (0.20)
prostate cancer 1.242 -.192 .8572 -.009694 -.00599
(2.44)** (0.88) (1.38) (0.96) (0.46)
lung cancer .5077 -.21 .5299 -.01453 -.002589 .3014
(1.22) (1.23) (1.10) (1.81)* (0.26) (7.95)***
colon cancer .9681 .3181 .03662 -.01346 .006045
(2.54)** (2.01)** (0.08) (1.81)* (0.62)
skin cancer .4673 -.1569 .6625 -.01696 -.006844
(1.07) (0.84) (1.29) (1.97)** (0.65)
heart disease - -.2628 1.278 .01453 -.01906
(1.70)* (2.82)*** (6.91)*** (2.09)**
heart attack 1.182 .1753 .7076 -.007819 -.003539
(3.24)*** (1.10) (1.55) (1.08) (0.39)
respiratory disease .7097 .04212 1.276 -.01883 -.01343 .1821
(1.72)* (0.25) (2.37)** (2.34)** (1.25) (4.59)***
stroke .8022 -.1859 1.263 -.004025 -.01792
(2.23)** (1.21) (2.76)*** (0.57) (1.95)*
traffic accident .6699 -.06071 -.087 -.01419 .003783
(1.59) (0.34) (0.17) (1.71)* (0.36)
,.....
,.....
-..l

Table 13, continued
Sick Year Terms: Basic Terms *Confidence * Vulnerability *Age * Vulnerability *Smoker *Control *At Risk
*Age
*heart attack 341 59.19 -75.01 -U78 .7862
(3.13)*** (1.66)* (0.70) (0.62) (0.37)
*respiratory disease 412.1 23.98 144.5 -3.297 -2.528 - -2.359 14.61
(3.51)*** (0.64) (1.10) (1.72)* (1.06) (0.40) (2.77)***
*stroke 185.4 12.53 -54.33 1.817 .2489 - -6.593 1.023
(1.60) (0.35) (0.44) (0.93) (0.11) (0.87) (0.15)
*traffic accident 208.8 -15.61 22.91 .8777 -2.232 - -7.99 6.511
(1.90)* (0.41) (0.21) (0.44) (0.97) (1.33) (UI)
*diabetes 407.7 38.56 124.5 -4.163 -2.274 - -3 -8.932
(3.42)*** (0.82) (0.94) (2.11)** (0.91) (0.51) (1.72)*
*Alzheimer's disease 273.2 73.93 11.61 -1.243 -.5095 - 13.17 -5.859
(2.12)** (1.77)* (0.08) (0.60) (0.20) (1.93)* (0.95)
Lost Life-Year Terms:
(a30 )Arr:s log (pdvl: + I)
-588.2
(2.70)***
*any cancer - - - - - -2.17 -11.07
(0.35) (2.09)**
*breast cancer -245.9 -42.62 24.63 5.492 -.2938
(1.70)* (0.94) (0.18) (I.76)* (0.11)
*prostate cancer 72.63 -80.97 78.29 -2.013
(0.52) (1.67)* (0.61) (0.75)
......
......
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Table 13, continued
Lost Life-Year Terms: Basic Terms *Confidence * Vulnerability *Age * Vulnerability *Smoker *Control *At Risk
*Age
*Iung cancer 83.94 -.1182 -10.39 -.3346 .8254
(0.70) (0.00) (0.10) (0.12) (0.40)
*colon cancer 106.5 -14.24 33.45 -.9154 -.7189
(0.88) (0.43) (0.33) (0.33) (0.34)
*skin cancer 165.7 4.98 7.409 -2.116 1.044
(1.33) (0.16) (0.07) (0.76) (0.45)
*heart disease - 26.59 177.3 1.758 -4.529 -3.476 -5.42
(0.70) (1.55) (0.61) (1.90)* (0.47) (0.87)
*heart attack -5.615 -21.87 -23.12 1.826 .5835
(0.05) (0.84) (0.29) (0.69) (0.36)
*respiratory disease 27.96 23.01 52.7 .5354 -.6867 - 15.67 -3.674
(0.21) (0.57) (0.40) (0.18) (0.26) (2.85)*** (0.75)
*stroke 8.59 -62.23 98.15 1.564 -2.561 - -12.8 8.593
(0.07) (2.29)** (1.10) (0.58) (1.46) (1.77)* (1.32)
*traffic accident 66.42 -28.86 -82.59 .6184 2.181 - -3.239 -7.596
(0.57) (0.98) (0.99) (0.23) (1.22) (0.57) (1.38)
*diabetes 116.9 -41.31 155.9 -.2036 -2.992 - -7.497 4.329
(0.97) (1.20) (1.57) (0.07) (1.48) (1.35) (0.88)
*Alzheimer's disease 285.1 -101.7 116.3 -3.743 -1.677 - 6.899 7.343
(2.00)** (2.50)** (0.87) (1.24) (0.69) (1.08) (1.23)
Observations 20544
LogL -10252.933
>-'
N
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Table 14: Parsimonious Model (Alternatives =20,544)
Shifters (O=neutral, except for age)
Basic Terms *Confidence *Vulnerability * Age *Vulnerability *Control *At Risk * Smoker
*Age
Disease Labels:
breast cancer .653 -.3443 .311
(5.22)*** (1.95)* (3.06)***
prostate cancer .6285 .3988
(4.66)*** (3.71)***
lung cancer -.2941 - .3465 - - - - .309
(3.37)*** (4.21)*** (8.44)***
colon cancer .2128 - .3377
(2.91)*** (4.28)***
skin cancer -.4215 - .2669
(5.27)*** (3.04)***
heart disease - -.1002 .7906 - -.008198
(0.70) (3.00)*** (1.60)
heart attack .6626 - .536
(8.40)*** (6.86)***
respiratory disease -.4092 - .4802 - - - - .1894
(4.63)*** (5.43)*** (4.92)***
stroke .4475 -.1737 .538
(5.56)*** (1.34) (6.82)***
traffic accident - - - -.005923
(3.91)***
,....
N
,....
Table 14, continued
Basic Terms *Confidence *Vulnerability * Age *Vulnerability *Control *At Risk * Smoker
*Age
Diabetes .8273 - .5445 -.0179
(3.60)*** (6.31)*** (3.95)***
Alzheimer's disease .4747 - .2368 -.01119
(1.44) (2.82)*** (1.74)*
Sick Year Terms:
(alo)~n~ log (pdvi: +1)
-56.65
(4.88)***
*general cancer - - - - - -13.69
(2.72)***
*breast cancer - - - 1.205
(2.10)**
*prostate cancer 74.55
(2.19)**
*heart disease - -35.45 - -.6759
(1.34) (2.55)**
*heart attack 78.68
.(3.24)***
*respiratory disease - - - - - - 12.13
(2.93)***
*stroke 76.24
(3.10)***
*traffic accident - - -67.29
(2.64)***
......
N
N
......
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Table 14, continued
Basic Model Terms:
(poo xl05 ) [linear net income term]
(PIO X109 )[quadratic net income term]
(a20 )~II:s log (pdvr/ +1)
(aI3 ) [P(se() - pJ ~II:s [log (pdV(A + l)]
(a31 )ageiQ .~II:s log (pdv1t +1)
(a32 )age;20.m:s log (pdv1t +1)
(a40 )~II:s [log (pdV(A +1)T
(a41 )ageio ·m:s[log (pdV(A +1)T
Basic Terms
5.369
(7.80)***
-.198
(3.90)***
-17.42
(1.64)
3.517
(2.35)**
19.29
(2.73)***
-.1614
(2.39)**
221.5
(2.51)**
-8.218
(2.29)**
*Confidence *Vulnerability * Age *Vulnerability
*Age *Control *At Risk * Smoker
.....
~
-- ----- -------------------
Table 14, continued
Basic Model Terms:
(a42 )age;o .~rr~S [log (pdv1t +1)r
(aS2 ) age;o .
~rr~s [log (pdvit +1)J. [log (pdV(A +1)]
Basic Terms
.07364
(2.12)**
.006295
(2.22)**
·Confidence ·Vulnerability • Age
·Vulnerability
·Age ·Control •At Risk • Smoker
Observations 20544
LogL -10356.924
Absolute value of Z statistics in parentheses; • significant at 10%; .* significant at 5%; **. significant at 1%
......
tv
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Table 15: Simulated WTP for a Microrisk Reduction, by health threat (two scenarios, income = $42,000) a
Profile: Sudden Death Now : 10 vear latencv; sick 5 vears, then death
Health Threat
Aeenow 30 45 60 30 45 60
Breast Cancer 7.87 8.39 6.98 8.66 6.64 4.44(4.65,11.34) (5.89, 11.25) (4.56,9.57) , (6.6, 11.04) (4.08,8.35) (2.93, 6.03)
Prostate Cancer 7.38 7.78 6.4 7.25 5.65 4.05(4.22,10.74) (5.29, 10.58) (3.82, 9.08) (5.26,9.42) (4.1,7.44) (2.62, 5.69)
Colon Cancer 4.46 4.88 3.47 6.32 4.76 3.09(1.76, 7.32) (3.09,6.91) (1.72,5.35) (4.67, 8.15) (3.6,6.03) (2.03, 4.26)
.95 0.97 0.22 , 2.36 0.78 0.04Lung Cancer (-2.3,3.14) (-1.05,2.74) (-2.49, 1.29) (0.8,3.99) (-0.53, 1.92) (-2.34, .3)
...* smoker 10.59 11.05 9.62 12.43 10.93 9.24(7.18, 14.26) (8.32, 14.21) (7, 12.79) (9.75, 15.7) (8.58, 13.59) (7.22, 11.86)
0.43 0.36 0.04 1.37 0.16 0Skin Cancer (-3.28, 2.2) (-1.98, 1.62) (-3.49,0.26) (-0.01,2.79) (-1.55,0.85) (-3.49, -.67)
8.22 8.68 7.29 7.58 6.09 4.4Heart Attack (5.38,11.5) (6.58, 11.1) (5.38,9.61) (5.76,9.69) (4.58,7.84) (3.01,5.97)
Heart Disease 8.26 8.73 7.36 9.05 7.01 4.82(5.38, 11.65) (6.46, 11.35) (5.24,9.96) (7.08, 11.32) (5.59, 8.62) (3.6,6.26)
6.37 6.79 5.4 5.96 4.33 2.7Stroke (3.45, 9.4) (4.85,8.98) (3.6, 7.53) (4.17,7.93) (2.99, 5.87) (1.29, 4.13)
0.38 0.29 0.03 1.18 0.13 0Respiratory Disease (-3.63, 2.12) (-2.29, 1.56) (-3.74,0.08) (-0.3, 2.81) (-1.97,0.85) (-3.78, -0.69)
...* smoker 5.95 6.34 5.01 7.81
6.22 4.62
(2.96,9.13) (3.9,8.99) (2.65,7.48) (5.57, 10.51) (4.29, 8.34) (2.73,6.72)
.......
t-.:>
0\
Table 15, continued : :
Profile: Sudden Death Now 10 year latency: sick 5 years. then death
Health Threat
A£enow: 30 45 60 : 30 45 60
Traffic Accident 1.11 0.82 0.07 2.69 0.63 0.01(-1.72, 3.48) (-1.03, 2.33) (-3.2,0.61) (1.42,4.08) (-0.6,1.64) (-3.2, -0.12)
Diabetes 5.3 3.36 0.3 7.15 3.24 0.07(2.32, 8.63) (1.64, 5.23) (-2.35, 1.57) (5.1,9.53) (2.1,4.45) (-2.15,0.47)
Alzheimer's Disease 0.2 0.85 2.24 0.73 0.91 1.03(-10.19,1.6) (-3.25,3.28) (-0.5,4.98) (-4.06, 3.35) (-1.31,2.7) (-0.55,2.43)
a Cells describe simulated distribution of WTP (across 1000 random draws from the joint distribution of the estimated parameters). Since negative values are often an artifact of
the functional form and there was no opportunity for any respondent to express a negative WTP, we convert negative simulated values to zero before calculating the mean (first
entry in each cell). However, we also report the 5th and 95th percentiles of the distribution before negative values are converted to zero.
.......
N
-....l
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APPENDIXB
SCENARIO ADJUSTMENT INDICATORS
In this Appendix, we carefully consider the empirical correlates of the two
scenario adjustment indicators. Table A-I gives descriptive statistics for these variables
and a set of regressors I used to explain systematic variations in their magnitudes. First,
we use a simple binary logit model to examine how the value of the indicator variable
l(nevelji) can be explained by a wide variety of (a.) characteristics of the respondent,
and (b.) attributes of the health risk targeted by each program. Each respondent
considers ten different health risk-reduction programs, in five sets of two, with each
choice set including the status quo as a third alternative. In total, therefore, 15,040
substantive illness profiles and health risk reduction programs are considered in the
7,520 choice scenarios analyzed in this paper. For 1,156 (7.69%) of these illness
profiles, respondents indicated their belief that they would never benefit from the risk-
reduction program.
Models 1 and 2 in Table A-2 are ad hoc binary logit models to explain these
7.69% of cases where l(nevelj j ) =1. Missing data for some of the explanatory variables
used in these preliminary exploratory models accounts for the reduction of the number
of illness profiles from 15,040 to 13,626. The logit specification suggests that people
are more likely to say that a pmiicular program will never benefit them if they are
female, if they currently have a larger number of other illnesses, if they feel at greater
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subjective risk for getting other illnesses, if they are a member of a larger household, or
if they are a single parent. People are less likely to say the program will never benefit
them if they are presented with an illness profile that includes long-term pain and/or
disability, if they have not attended college, if they acknowledge a higher subjective
risk of getting this disease, if they have (on average) more room to improve their health
habits, and if they currently have children in their household.
Now we explore the determinants of the approximately continuous measure of
how much the stated benefit and the perceived benefits differ, called Bendifj/. This is
a minimum overestimate of the latency, in this case using an ordinary least squares
(OLS) model. The Bendiff/ for a program is known only if the individual does not
state that they expect never to benefit from the program (i.e. if l(nevel/) = 0). Thus,
we have a maximum of 15,040 - 1,156 = 13,884 potential observations on the Bendiff/
variable. For many respondents and many programs, the interval during which the
individual personally expects the benefits of the program to begin spans the onset time
specified in the illness profile. For these individuals and programs, Bendifj/ =0,
signaling minimal scenario adjustment with respect to the latency period. This happens
for 4,133 of the 13,884 programs for which Bendiff/ information is available. Latency
is overestimated to some degree for 1,542 programs, and underestimated for 8,209
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programs. The mean value of Bendiff/ is -7.57 (with a minimum of -59 and a
maximum of 29).32
Models 1 through 5 in Table A-3 demonstrate the significant determinants of
Bendiff/ across a variety of alternative specifications. Missing data for some of the
regressors again reduces the estimating sample, this time from 13,884 to 12,596 illness
profiles. The coefficients on age and age-squared are highly significant in the first two
models when latency variables for the specified illness profiles are left out of the model.
When latency variables are included (as in Models 3 through 5), the coefficients on the
age variables are no longer statistically significant. It is likely that latency effects are
captured by the age variables in the first two models. The insignificant age terms are
dropped from the specification in Model 4. Model 5 demonstrates the consequences of
using an interval-data model rather than treating Bendiff/ as an approximately
continuous variable. As is clear from in Figure 2, respondents were asked to specify the
future time interval when their benefits would start, and Model 5 more explicitly
captures the interval nature of these data. However, the estimates produced by Models 4
and 5 are very similar. The only notable difference is that the estimated coefficient on
the respondent's subjective risk of suffering other illnesses becomes statistically
insignificant in Model 5 (although the point estimate remains similar).
32 The scenario adjustment data with respect to latency thus suggests that underestimation predominates.
This may reflect opinions that acute cases of major illness do not typically come as a complete surprise.
They often occur after years of decline in the individual's general level of health.
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Models 4 and 5 suggest that individuals are more likely to overestimate the
latency period when they consider an illness profile with a longer period of pain or
disability, if the illness profile has pain/disability lasting more than 60 months, if they
feel at greater subjective risk for other illnesses, if they belong to a two-income
household, or if they will have a child under the age of eighteen in the household at the
time of the stated onset of the disease. Individuals are more likely to assume that the
latency in their own case will be less than the stated latency in the survey if they have
not attended college, if they already have the illness in question, if they have a larger
number of other major illnesses, if they feel at a higher subjective risk for this illness, if
they have (on average) more room to improve their health habits, or if they have
children or are single parents. The length of the latency period stated in the illness
profile is also an important determinant ofBendif//. Not surprisingly, a longer stated
latency period in the scenario makes respondents more likely to underestimate the
latency and vice versa.
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Table B-1: Descriptive Statistics for Correlates of Scenario Adjustment
Variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Dependent Variables
Will never benefit from program*
l(neve,/) 0.077
Minimum overestimate of latency**
Bendiff;j
-8.12 12.3 -58 29
Minimum overestimate if latency
overestimated
Bendiff;j> 0 7.72 6.45 1 29
Minimum overestimate if latency
underestimated
Bendiff; j < 0
-15.2 10.8 -58 -1
Attributes ofstated illness profile
Duration of pain/disability (months if less
than 60) 35.8 38.0 0 192
1(Longterm pain/disability) (>60 months) 0.288 0.453
Age/gender/income of respondent
Age of respondent (years) 49.9 14.9 25 93
1(Female) 0.504
Income ($10,000) 5.18 3.38 0.5 15.0
Educational attainment
l(Less than HS) 0.104 0.305
l(High School) 0.337 0.473
l(Some College) 0.251 0.433
Objective health status
1(Have same illness) 0.040 0.195
Count of other major illness 0.294 0.578
Subjective health risks
Subjective risk, same illness -0.223 1.24
Subjective risk, other illness -0.242 0.861
Avg room to improve health habits 3.446 0.831
Table B-2, Continued
Respondent's household structure
Size of household
1(Have kids)
1(Single parent)
1(Dualinc-w/ or w/out kids)
1(Have kid at onset)
l(Single parent & kid at onset)
1(Dual-income & kid at onset)
2.57
0.287
0.017
0.647
0.029
0.001
0.023
1.26
0.452
0.129
0.478
0.169
0.030
0.150
133
* To conserve space, descriptive statistics are based on illness profiles with complete data for the
model to explain BenefitsDiffer/ (i.e. 12,596 observations). Proportion for variable l(never) is
displayed for the 13,626 illness profiles with complete data when this is the dependent variable.
** 29.3% of the minimum overestimate of latency (Bendiff/ ) observations are equal to zero.
Bendiff j =0 if the respondent's subjective latency interval contains the latency stated in the
survey.
Table B-2: Models to Explain "l(never)" (Program would not benefit me)
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1 - Binary Logit 2 - Binary Logit
Attributes of illness profile
Duration of pain/disability
(months ifless than 60)
1(Long term pain/disability> 60 months)
Some demographic characteristics of respondents
Age of respondent (years)
1(Female)
Educational attainment
1(Less than HS)
I (High School)
1(Some College)
Health status and Risks
1(Have same illness)
Count of other major illness
Subjective risk, same illness
Subjective risk, other illness
Avg. room to improve health habits
Respondent's household structure
Size of household
1(Have kids)
1(Single parent)
1(Dualinc-w/ or w/out kids)
1(Have kid at onset)
1(Dual-income & kid at onset)
Constant
Observations
LogL
0.001
(0.57)
-0.157
(1.97)**
-0.006
(0.45)
0.010
(0.79)
0.375
(5.61)***
-0.254
(2.09)**
-0.274
(3.27)***
-0.143
(1.64)
0.187
(0.99)
0.116
(1.99)**
-0.342
(10.15)***
0.152
(3.23)***
-0.081
(2.01)**
0.144
(3.54)***
-0.167
(1.42)
0.578
(2.48)**
0.017
(0.22)
0.064
(0.16)
-0.173
(0.37)
-2.720
(6.85)***
13626
-3550.8
0.000
(0.50)
-0.155
(1.95)*
0.381
(5.71)***
-0.213
(1.77)*
-0.246
(2.98)***
-0.136
(1.57)
0.222
(1.18)
0.146
(2.61 )***
-0.343
(10.20)***
0.147
(3.12)***
-0.094
(2.36)**
0.140
(3.70)***
-0.219
(1.96)*
0.564
(2.48)**
-2.708
(15.76)***
13626
-3552.8
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Table B-3: Models to Explain How Perceived Benefits Differ (Bendiffj)
3-0LS 4-0LS 5-0LS
1- OLS 2-0LS Latency Latency (Interval )*
Bendiffj Bendiffj Bendiffj Bendiffj Bendiffj
Attributes of illness profile
Pain/disability (months if <60) 0.033 0.033 0.012 0.011 0.011
(11.38)*** (11.37)*** (4.65)*** (4.31)*** (4.15)***
l(pain/disability) (>60 months) 0.502 0.499 0.578 0.574 0.578
(2.07)** (2.06)** (2.76)*** (2.74)*** (2.61)***
Some demographic characteristics of respondents
Age of respondent (years) 0.314 0.311 0.012
(6.92)*** (6.87)*** (0.15)
Age-squared (100s of years) -0.116 -0.113 -0.078
(2.70)*** (2.64)*** (1.10)
1(Female) -0.205
(0.99)
Educational attainment
1(Less than HS) -1.832 -1.876 -1.712 -1.813 -1.949
(4.79)*** (4.93)*** (5.21)*** (5.52)*** (5.64)***
1(High School) -0.673 -0.701 -0.559 -0.587 -0.516
(2.56)** (2.68)*** (2.47)** (2.59)*** (2.15)**
1(Some College) -0.239 -0.256 -0.375 -0.365 -0.405
(0.86) (0.92) (1.56) (1.52) (1.59)
Objective health status
1(Have same illness) -2.554 -2.542 -2.125 -2.181 -2.118
(4.70)*** (4.67)*** (4.52)*** (4.64)*** (4.29)***
Count of other major illnesses -0.567 -0.555 -0.640 -0.704 -0.718
(2.97)*** (2.90)*** (3.88)*** (4.28)*** (4.15)***
Subjective health risks
Subjective risk, same illness -1.115 -1.116 -1.411 -1.397 -1.471
(10.54)*** (10.56)*** (15.42)*** (15.28)*** (15.20)***
Avg. subjective risk, other
illness -0.039 -0.043 0.269 0.272 0.202
(0.25) (0.28) (2.01)** (2.04)** (1.43)
Avg. room to impr. health
habits -0.973 -0.974 -0.976 -0.935 -0.931
(7.40)*** (7.41)*** (8.60)*** (8.27)*** (7.79)***
Latency Period
Stated latency -0.250 -0.204 -0.251
(2.22)** (3.09)*** (3.57)***
(Stated latency)2 -0.001 -0.003 -0.004
(0.78) (3.97)*** (6.36)***
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-0.005
(2.33)**
-0.000
(0.82)
-0.019
(2.30)**
-0.746
(2.99)***
-1.979
(2.60)***
0.769
(3.69)***
3.903
(3.24)***
-2.679
(2.01)**
7.290
(13.14)***
Table B-3, Continued
(Stated latency)*(Age) -0.013 -0.008
(3.50)*** (3.42)***
(Stated latency)*(Age2) 0.000 0.000
(2.77)*** (0.58)
(Stated latency) *1 (Female) -0.025 -0.025
(3.25)*** (3.20)***
Respondent's household structure
Size of household -0.118
(0.88)
I(Have kids) -1.987 -2.208 -0.663 -0.673
(5.38)*** (8.27)*** (2.81)*** (2.86)***
I(Single parent) -1.858 -1.794 -2.058 -1.993
(2.20)** (2.15)** (2.85)*** (2.76)***
I(Dualinc-wl or w/out kids) 0.701 0.625 0.754 0.763
(2.87)*** (2.74)*** (3.83)*** (3.88)***
1(Have current kid at onset) 14.445 14.371 2.557 3.304
(11.11)*** (11.07)*** (2.22)** (2.91)***
1(Dual-income & kid at onset) -2.681 -2.601 -2.354 -2.394
(1.84)* (1.78)* (1.87)* (1.90)*
Constant -17.957 -18.157 8.782 6.449
(14.36)*** (14.64)*** (3.55)*** (12.29)***
Observations 12596" 12596 12596 12596 12596
Log L -33818.9
R-squared 0.12 0.12 0.35 0.35
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
"Sample size is smaller for models in Table B-3 than Table B-2 since they do not include those individuals who said
the program would never benefit them.
* Interval-data model treats Bendiff/ as an interval rather than as an approximately continuous variable. This is
done using the upper and lower estimates of the stated latency of the benefits of the program and using the intreg
command in Stata.
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APPENDIXC
ALTERNATIVE SCENARIO ADJUSTMENT MODELS
Extensive, rather than parsimonious, version of main model
Table S in the main body of the paper gives parameter estimates from the model that
corrects for scenario adjustment where all interaction terms with persistently
insignificant coefficients have been dropped. Table C-l in this Appendix provides the
estimates for a model with the complete set of interactions.
Extensive and parsimonious versions of a "small" model
It may be important to demonstrate that the statistical significance of the interaction
terms involving the two scenario adjustments variables in this study are not an artifact
of the non-linear functional form of the specification in the main model. Tables C-2
and C-3 demonstrate that there are significant shifts in the estimated parameters even in
simpler five-parameter versions of the specification for the program choice model.
Under- or over-estimate of latency (ordered discrete variable)
In addition to the interval-data model for the Bendi,ff/ variable documented in ModelS
in Appendix C, Table C-3, we also considered a second specification for over- or under-
estimating the latency. An ordered categorical variable ordered _latency! is explored
in the context of an ordered logit model. The variable ordered _latency! is an ordered
categorical variable that takes on the value 0 if the upper bound of the age interval
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checked among the selections in Figure 2 is lower than the stated age of onset given in
the choice scenario. It takes the value 1 if the age interval checked in Figure 2 contains
the stated age of onset, and take a value of 2 if the lower bound of the age interval lies
strictly above the stated age of onset in the choice scenario. In these data, latency is
underestimated for about 54.6% of illness profiles, and it is overestimated for about
10.3% of profiles.
Results for this model are displayed in Table C-4. Individuals are more likely to
overestimate the latency of the illness if they have finished only high school, have
temporary or long-term pain described the illness profile stated in the scenario, or will
likely have a current child still in their household at the stated onset of the disease.
Individuals are more likely to underestimate the length of the latency if they have a
lower income, have either this illness or another major illness, have a higher subjective
risk for this illness, have children, or will likely have a current child still in their
household at the stated onset of the disease.
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Table C-l: Scenario Adjustment Model with All Interaction Terms
(Alternatives = 22560)
i Model Al I Model A2
(Parameter) Variable IUncorrected I Corrected xBendif!/
0.434
(1.07)
-0.005
(1.20)
0.248
(4.11)***
-0.027
(0.64)
7.233
(7.13)***
0.012
(0.08)
1.177
(1.00)
5.900
(0.36)
-0.309
(0.41)
0.012
(1.47)
-3.979
(0.41 )
0.308
(0.72)
-0.006
(1.24)
-13.371
(1.42)
-0.117
(0.01)
0.101
(0.58)
-2.702
(0.76)
10.235
(2.95)***
248.650
(3.87)***
6.055
(0.60)
-60.728
(1.12)
499.341
(0.49)
-19.464
(0.47)
0.144
(0.36)
484.391
(0.81)
-7.705
(0.33)
0.032
(0.15)
-416.324
(0.89)
0.063
(1.85)*
-6.993
(1.95)*
8.387
(10.03)***
-2.385
(3.86)***
-58.359
(5.05)***
3.892
(2.15)**
-51.663
(4.52)***
-1019.412
(4.11)***
48.701
(4.80)***
-0.412
(4.24)***
339.442
(3.13)***
-17.555
(3.95)***
0.148
(3.44)***
141.815
(1.55)
-6.993
(1.95)*
0.063
(1.85)*
! 8.387
I (10.03)***
-2.385
(3.86)***
-58.359
(5.05)***
3.892
(2.15)**
-51.663
(4.52)***
-1019.412
(4.11)***
48.701
(4.80)***
-0.412
(4.24)***
339.442
(3.13)***
-17.555
(3.95)***
0.148
(3.44)***
141.815
(1.55)
(au )[P(sel) - pJ .1I1~s [log (pdvit +1)JI
i(az).1I1~s log (pdVr,A +1) i
M A I(a30 ).1I1; log (pdvl; +1) i
(a" jage;, .LIn:' log (pdvl,' +1) I
(Po X 105 ) [first income term]
(A xl 09 ) [ second income term]
(alO).1I1~s log (pdvit +1)
(a3Z )age;Zo ..1I1~s log (pdv1t +1)
(a40).1I1~s [log (pdv1t +l)T
(a41 )age;o ·m~s [log (pdv1t +1)T
(a4Z )age;Zo ..1I1~s [log (pdvl/ +1)T
(aso ).1I1~s [log (pdvi;A +1)J
-[log (pdvl;A +1)J
(aS1)age;o ..1I1~s [log (pdvi/ +1)]
-[log (pdvl;A +l)J
(asz)age;o . .1I1~s [log (pdvit +l)J
-[log (pdvl/ +l)J
LogL i -11694.646 I -10948.179
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Table C-2: Minimal Model (Alternatives = 22560)
i Model B1 Model B2
(Parameter) Variable
I !
!Uncorrected Corrected x1(neve1/) xBendiff/
I
;;::ll::~~:~~:::~:::ml .1'1
(alO )LlII~S log (pdV(A +1) :
(a13 ) [P(sel;) - pJ LlII~s [log (pdV(A +1)] ,
(az)LlII~S log (pdvr/ +1) I
( IX, JAW' log (pdvZ: +1) I
5.342
(9.17)***
-2.160
(4.61)***
-27.053
(4.56)***
3.297
(2.29)**
-21.870
(2.35)**
-30.409
(5.97)***
9.991
(12.98)***
-2.014
I (3.33)***
-37.493
(4.99)***
3.475
(1.90)*
-37.893
(3.43)***
-36.974
, (5.89)***
-1.787
(0.54)
9.731
(2.84)***
109.601
(2.75)***
5.121
(0.50)
-60.407
(1.13)
190.347
(5.79)***
0.409
(7.40)***
-0.026
(0.64)
5.348
(7.75)***
-0.033
(0.23)
0.993
(0.86)
6.594
(11.12)***
LogL I -11726.31 I -11073.051
Table C-3: Parsimonious Minimal Model (Alternatives = 22560)
Model B1' ! ModelB2'
(Parameter) Variable Uncorrected ICorrected x1(neve1/) xBendiff/
!
(Po x 105 ) [first income term] 5.342 I 9.816 -1.900 0.387
(9.17)*** 1(14.00)*** (0.57) (10.18)***
(PI x 109 )[second income term] -2.160 I -1.800 9.425! -(4.61)*** i (3.58)*** (2.76)***
(alo )LlII ~s log (pdvi;A +1) -27.053 I -37.184 103.398 5.398(4.56)*** I (4.97)*** (2.72)*** (7.98)***
3.297 I 3.786 - -
(a13 )[P(sel;) - pJ LlII~s [log (pdvit +1)] (2.29)** I (2.39)**!
!
(az)LlII~S log (pdvr/ +1) -21.870 ! -43.664 - -(2.35)** I (4.45)***
(a3 )LlII~S log (pdvl jA+1) -30.409 ! -36.855 188.932 6.619(5.97)*** ! (5.89)*** (5.74)*** (11.22)***
LogL -11726.31 -11074.305
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Table C-4: Correlates of Bendiff/ as a Discrete Variable
1- Ordered 2 - Ordered 3 - Ordered
logit logit logit
Bendiftj Bendiff/ Bendiftj
Attributes of illness profile
Duration of pain/disability
(months if less than 60) 0.004 0.002 0.002
(5.05)*** (1.93)* (1.99)**
1(Longterm
pain/disability) (>60
months) 0.064 0.094 0.095
(0.93) (1.30) (1.32)
Some demographic
characteristics of respondents
Age of respondent (years) 0.036 0.000
(2.72)*** (0.00)
Age-squared (100s of
years) -0.029 0.003
(2.34)** (0.15)
1(Female) 0.005
(0.09)
Educational attainment
1(Less than HS) -0.939 -0.940 -0.936
(6.80)*** (6.68)*** (6.67)***
1(High School) -0.040 -0.005 -0.007
(0.57) (0.07) (0.10)
l(Some College) -0.202 -0.207 -0.209
(2.62)*** (2.57)** (2.60)***
Objective health status
1(Have same illness) -0.679 -0.654 -0.651
(3.20)*** (3.01)*** (3.00)***
Count of other major
illness -0.119 -0.137 -0.132
(2.08)** (2.28)** (2.23)**
Subjective health risks
Subjective risk, same
illness -0.132 -0.200 -0.201
(4.38)*** (6.25)*** (6.28)***
Subjective risk, other
illness -0.081 -0.031 -0.028
(1.86)* (0.68) (0.62)
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Table C-4, Continued
Avg room to improve
health habits -0.155 -0.174 -0.178
(4.30)*** (4.59)*** (4.72)***
Latency Period
Stated latency 0.013 0.010
(0.24) (0.31)
Stated latency squared -0.003 -0.003
(6.86)*** (7.70)***
Latency and age
interaction 0.003 0.002
(1.35) (1.86)*
Latency and age squared
interaction -0.000 -0.000
(3.19)*** (4.71)***
Respondent's household structure
Size of household -0.011
(0.29)
1(Have kids) -0.284 -0.097
(2.64)*** (1.13)
1(Single parent) -1.204 -1.319 -1.387
(2.80)*** (3.06)*** (3.25)***
1(Dualinc-w/ or w/out
kids) 0.107 0.120 0.107
(1.55) (1.82)* (1.67)*
1(Have kid at onset) 1.809 0.155
(6.80)*** (1.03)
1(Dual-income & kid at
onset) -0.330
(1.13)
Observations 12596 12596 12596
LogL -4259.161 -3697.929 -3698.915
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses, * significant at 10%; **
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
APPENDIXD
FULL HOUSEHOLD STRUCTURE MODEL
Table D-l: Full Household Structure Model
(n = 1801 individuals, 7520 choices, 22560 alternatives)
Modell
Linear net income term
Model 2
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(Poo xl05 ) [linear net income term]
... * l(female)
... * l(female) * # kids 6-12 yrs
·.. * # kids 13-17 yrs
... * l(female) * l(dual-income)
Quadratic net income term
(P1O X I09 ) [ quadratic net income term]
... * l(female)
·.. * # kids 0-1 yrs
Sick-years terms .
(a'1O ),1I1:s log (pdV(A +1)
... * l(female)
·.. * # kids 2-5 yrs
... * l(female) *# kids 2-5 yrs
... * 1(single parent)
...* l(kids in home at onset)
'" * l(kids in home at onset) * l(dual-income)
4.767
(6.34)***
6.718
(5.71)***
-2.398
(2.14)**
2.139
(2.31)**
-2.128
(2.07)**
-.2994
(4.11)***
-.7802
(2.46)**
-70.14
(5.17)***
28.13
(2.15)**
103
(3.75)***
-66.87
(2.06)**
-111.6
(2.94)***
4.814
(6.40)***
6.668
(5.66)***
-2.298
(2.04)**
2.022
(2.18)**
-2.073
(2.01)**
-.2987
(4.10)***
-.7578
(2.39)**
-69.77
(5.14)***
27.41
(2.09)**
103.5
(3.75)***
-68
(2.08)**
-1203
(1.91)*
-43.67
(0.80)
-90.22
(1.76)*
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Table D-l Continued
Recovered-years terms
(a20 )M1~S log (pdvr/ +1) -58.89 -59.57(5.81)*** (5.88)***
Lost life-years terms
(a30 )LlIl:s log (pdv1t +1)
-830.5 -804.2
(3.88)*** (3.75)***
... * l(female) 25.07 25.62
(2.24)** (2.28)**
... * # kids 2-5 yrs -41.51 -41.74
(2.42)** (2.43)**
... * # kids 13-17 yrs 23.25 22.91
(1.99)** (1.94)*
(a 31 )ageio . ilI1~s log (pdvl;A +1)
41.77 40.73
(5.00)*** (4.87)***
... * l(single parent) 32.34
(2.01)**
(a32 )age;2o .ilI1~s log (pdvI;A +1)
-.3596 -.3507
(4.65)*** (4.52)***
Lost life-years squared terms
(a4o)ilI1~s [log (pdvI;A +l)T 292.2 279.6(3.06)*** (2.91)***
... * 1(single parent) 258.2
(1.76)*
(a41 )ageiO .ilI1:s [log (pdvl;A +l)T -16.03 -15.53(4.24)*** (4.09)***
(a42)agei2o .ilI1:s [log (pdvl/ +l)T .1377 .1335(3.84)*** (3.72)***
'" * 1(single parent) -.1899
(2.14)**
Sick-years, Lost life-years interaction terms
71.03(aso )ilI1:s [log (pdvi;A +1)] .[log (pdvI;A +1)]
67.84
(0.80) (0.84)
... * l(kids in home at onset) 473.5 468.2
(1.98)** (1.97)**
(aS1 ) age;o . ilI1:s [log (pdvi;A +1)] .[log (pdV(A +1)]
-4.772 -4.888
(1.48) (1.51)
... * l(kids in home at onset) -19.36 -18.89
(1.83)* (1.80)*
(a S2 ) age:o . ilI1:s [ log (pdV(A +1)] .[ log (pdv1t +1)]
.04655 .04756
(1.56) (1.59)
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Table D-l, Continued
... * 1(kids in home at onset) .2186 .2134
(1.92)* (1.89)*
Nuisance parameters
- shift if respondent believes "will never benefit"
(Ao X 109 ) [second income term] *l(nevef/) .745 .7459(2.97)*** (2.97)***
(alO)~I1:s log (pdvijA+1) *l(nevel/) 205.8 204.5(3.79)*** (3.76)***
(a40)~I1:s [log (pdvlt +l)T *l(nevel/) 397.5 403.9(4.54)*** (4.55)***
(a4I )age jO ·m:s [log (pdvl jA+l)T *l(nevel/) -5.232 -5.288(3.72)*** (3.72)***
(aso )~I1:s [log (pdvi;A +I)} [log (pdvl jA+:[)J -344.3 -347.9
*l(nevel/) (3.72)*** (3.74)***
(aS2 )age?o~I1:s [log (pdvijA+1)} [log (pdvl jA+1)J .07632 .07692
*l(neveT/) (3.33)*** (3.33)***
- shift with minimum overestimate of latency
(Poo X lOS) [first income term] *Bendi./f; j .236 .238(5.33)*** (5.37)***
(alO )m:s log (pdvijA+1) *Bendi./f;j 7.881 7.881(7.76)*** (7.76)***
(a30 )~I1:s log (pdvl;A +1) *Bendi./f;j -.1718 -.1813(0.07) (0.07)
(a32 )age?o' ~I1:s log (pdvl;A +1) *Bendi./f;j .007948 .00794(6.39)*** (6.37)***
(a42 )ageiO .m:s [log (pdvl jA+l)T *Bendi./f;j .1381 .1375(1.97)** (1.96)*
(a42 )age;2o .~I1:s [log (pdV(A +1)T *Bendi./f;j -.003806 -.003795(2.76)*** (2.74)***
(aso)~I1:s [log (pdvi;A +1)} [log (pdvlt +l)J -5.029 -5.044
*Bendi./f;j (4.37)*** (4.38)***
- shift with difference from mean participation probability
(aI3)[P(selj)-pJ~I1:s [log (pdvi;A +l)J 3.786 3.851
(2.38)** (2.42)**
Observations 22560 22560
LogL -10903.222 -10898.947
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